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This dissertation addresses many important economic questions sur-
rounding agency problems and vertical incentives. The first chapter docu-
ments the institutional background and pricing of U.S. reverse convertible
bonds. The primary reason why I look into the reverse convertible bonds
market is that it has interesting variation, enabling me to answer research
questions in the second chapter and the third chapter. The second chapter
shows some suggestive evidence of agency problems and vertical incentives in
the reverse convertible bonds market mainly using a reduced-form analysis.
Finally, the third chapter estimates the degree of agency problems and the
degree of vertical incentives using a structural model. I conclude by analyzing
various counterfactual scenarios.
The first chapter introduces a financial product called a reverse con-
vertible bond. It documents the product, market structure, and distribution
process of the bond. Using a data set on reverse convertible bonds, I calculate
vi
the fair value of each bond by which I derive an issuer markup, i.e. how much
an issuer earns by issuing each bond. This variable plays a critical role in
investigating agency problems and vertical incentive issues in the second and
third chapters. I also introduce my second data set on broker firms in this
chapter.
The second chapter documents some suggestive evidence of agency
problems and vertical incentives in the reverse convertible bonds market. Com-
bining two data sets described in the first chapter, I show descriptive evidence
of agency problems and vertical incentives which are against the relevant regu-
lations in the market. Specifically, broker behavior indicates agency problems
while the relevant regulations such as suitability standard or fiduciary duty
prevent them from doing so. In addition, I show that brokers are sensitive to
their vertically integrated upstream firm’s profit while arms-length transaction
laws prohibit them from doing so.
The final chapter estimates the degree of agency problems as well as the
degree of vertical incentives in the reverse convertible bonds market. Although
I show suggestive evidence of agency problems and vertical incentives in the
second chapter, it is not straight forward to estimate their severity using a
reduced-form analysis. Thus, I introduce a structural model that allows us to
estimate the degree of agency problems and the degree of vertical incentives.
The estimation results suggest that there are severe levels of both agency
problems and vertical incentives in the market. Lastly, the counterfactual
analysis shows that there is a substantial consumer surplus loss arising from
vii
agency problems. I also document a consumer welfare loss coming from vertical
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Chapter 1
Reverse Convertible Bonds and Their Pricing
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Research Question
This chapter studies reverse convertible bonds. The reason why I study
the reverse convertible bond market is that this market is a perfect place to
study agency problems and vertical incentives. I document the institutional
backgrounds of the reverse convertible bonds market and their pricing in this
chapter. Then, in later chapters, I will look into economic questions surround-
ing agency problems and vertical incentives using variation from this market
after I explain the product and the market structure in this chapter.
Many researchers have studied agency problems in the financial market.
Often times, investors rely on financial intermediaries when they choose a
product. However, there can be a conflict of interest meaning brokers’ own
incentives can differ from their investors’ incentives. What makes things more
complicated is that usually there are informational asymmetries. Brokers know
better than investors about the financial product and the market. This is the
very reason why investors rely on brokers in the first place. But, at the same
time, as brokers know better than investors, maybe it is possible for brokers to
navigate their investors into certain products in order to maximize their own
1
incentives rather than maximizing investors’ profits. Another consideration
is vertical incentives. If brokers are vertically integrated with their upstream
firms, they might be affected by their vertical relationships.
A reverse convertible bond market is a very interesting market to an-
swer these questions. I’ll explain why this is a perfect place to look into these
questions. First, a reverse convertible bond is a retail product targeting af-
fluent households rather than sophisticated institutional investors. To give
a better sense on who are buying these bonds, the Royal Bank of Canada’s
guidelines restricted reverse convertible bond sales to investors with the fol-
lowing profile: 1) $100,000 or more in annual income, 2) at least $100,000 in
liquid assets, 3) a net worth of $250,000 or more, 4) at least two years of prior
investment experience. 1 They are rich households but typically they are not
as sophisticated as institutional investors are. Second, a reverse convertible
bond is a complex financial product. Unlike other bonds, it is linked to an
underlying stock price, meaning a bond investor receives a payoff that is a
function of the price of a specific predetermined stock. For instance, many
reverse convertible bonds are linked to an Apple stock price. The returns from
these bonds are high when the Apple stock price stays high and the returns
are low when the Apple stock price goes below some trigger level. This is
one of the reasons why the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority issued a
warning about reverse convertible bonds. Here is what the Financial Indus-
1Source: StarTribune website. Available at https://www.startribune.com/
buy-a-reverse-convertible-sure-what-is-it/301260161/
2
try Regulatory Authority says: “The bottom line is that reverse convertibles
come not only with the risks that fixed income products ordinarily carry - such
as the risk of issuer default and inflation risk - but also with any additional
risks of underlying asset.” 2 As the payoff is linked to an underlying asset,
it involves many scenarios making the payoff complicated. Note that many
financial experts say retail investors should be more cautious when investing
in complex products. For instance, this is a direct quote from Larry Swedroe
who is a director of research for the Buckingham Asset Management Alliance.
“Generally speaking, the more complex an investment product, the faster you
should run from it. In nearly all cases, the complexity is designed to favor
the issuer.” 3 Note that this article introduces reverse convertible bonds as
one of the bad investments. Due to this complex feature, it is essentially a
high-risk, high-return product. A bond investor receives a high return as long
as the underlying stock price performs well. On the other hand, when the
underlying stock price decreases, there is a significant downside risk. Also, it
is not principal protected, so an investor may lose a significant amount of the
principal depending on the performance of a single stock price, which can be
very volatile. Third, it is a high-fee product. Many retail investors are pur-
chasing reverse convertible bonds by paying high fees. In this chapter, I show
that the seller’s margins are almost 7% on average using my data set. Fourth,
2Source: the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority web-
site. Available at https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/
reverse-convertibles-complex-investment-vehicles
3Source: CBS NEWS website. Available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
bad-investments-reverse-convertibles/
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there are almost no secondary markets for reverse convertible bonds. This is a
direct quote from MarketWatch columnist Chuck Jaffe’s article in the Seattle
Times: “That’s distinctly true for reverse convertibles, where the lack of a
secondary market makes them virtually impossible to unload at a fair price
before maturity.” 4 Also note that the article is titled “Stupid investment of
the week: Reverse convertible securities”. The StockMarketLoss also points
out the illiquidity of reverse convertible bonds: “Because secondary trading
for the reverse convertible would be limited or non-existent, the investment
would be highly illiquid.” 5
Another notable feature of the reverse convertible bond market is that
there have been many lawsuits involving this market. Although some retail
investors have expressed that they were looking for a stable and less risky
income, many retail investors purchased reverse convertible bonds following
their broker’s recommendations. At maturity, they found that they lost a
significant part of their principal as the underlying stock price fell. They were
not fully informed about the risk when they made an investment, causing
them to initiate lawsuits. Eventually, many broker firms who were sued by
their retail investors had to settle their charges by paying multi-million dollar
fines. In 2016, to name a few, UBS Financial Services paid $15 million to
settle charges in connection with the sale of reverse convertible bonds. 6 In
4Source: The Seattle Times website. Available at https://www.seattletimes.com/
business/stupid-investment-of-the-week-reverse-convertible-securities/
5Source: StockMarketLoss website. Available at https://www.stockmarketloss.com/
structured-products/apple-linked-reverse-convertibles/
6Source: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website. Available at https:
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2015, RBC Capital Markets also paid a $1 million fine for supervisory failures
resulting in sales of unsuitable reverse convertible bonds. 7 In 2011, Wells
Fargo Investments was fined $2 million for unsuitable reverse convertible bond
sales to senior citizens who were over 80 years old. 8 In 2010, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority fined H&R Block Financial Advisors $200,000
for failing to establish adequate procedures for supervising sales of reverse
convertible bonds to its retired couple. 9 Although there have been many
lawsuits concering reverse convertible bonds, there are many retail investors
who engage in this market. In terms of market size, this bond market exceeded
10 billion dollars in the U.S. and over 50 billion dollars globally in 2008. 10
Given the large number of lawsuits in this market, one may wonder
why retail investors are buying reverse convertible bonds. There could be
many reasons. One reason could be because of its complex structure. As
mentioned, reverse convertible bonds have a complex payoff which makes it
difficult for retail investors to evaluate risks properly. For instance, in a later
section, I calculate the risks associated with reverse convertible bonds using
equity option pricing models from Reiner and Rubinstein (1991a, 1991b) which
//www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-197.html
7Source: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Avail-
able at https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2015/
finra-orders-rbc-pay-fine-and-restitution-totaling-more-14-million
8Source: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Avail-
able at https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2011/
finra-fines-wells-fargo-2-million-unsuitable-sales-reverse-convertibles
9The MarketWatch website. Available at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
regulator-fines-hr-block-200k-for-poor-controls-2010-02-16
10Laise (2008), Alloway (2015)
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are modifications of the Black and Scholes option pricing model. It is hard
to expect most retail investors to be in a position to use these pricing models
when they make an investment decision. There is a quote from StockMar-
ketLoss: “The broker-dealer was charging you an up-front embedded fee (2%
or much more) for assembling and packaging the reverse convertible’s individ-
ual components, but if you wanted to know the true size of this embedded
fee, you’d find it virtually impossible to calculate.” 11 Next, maybe they
are misled by high coupons, especially in a low-yield environment. Many re-
verse convertible bonds attract retail investors by paying high coupons. In
my data set, the average coupon is higher than 10%. However, this does not
guarantee retail investors a 10% return. When an underlying stock price falls,
their return could be -30% instead of 10%. Coupled with the fact that reverse
convertibles have a complex structure, it could give retail investors the wrong
impression that these bonds pay higher coupons without significant risks. A
relevant article titled “Risky Strategy Lures Investors Seeking Yield - Pop-
ular ‘Reverse Convertibles’ Offer Lucrative Payouts But Could Cause Steep
Losses” was published in the Wall Street Journal in 2008. It describes as fol-
lows. “Wall Street is luring income-hungry investors with complex securities
that come with big risks as well as extravagant yields.” 12 Larry Swedroe of
Buckingham Asset Management also describes this as “People get mesmerized
11Source: StockMarketLoss website. Available at https://www.stockmarketloss.com/
structured-products/apple-linked-reverse-convertibles/
12Source: The Wall Street Journal website. Available at https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB120648718371963833
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by the high yield. That is what attracts them to the shiny red apple that
the witch is holding. “ 13 It is also worth noting that the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority issued an investor alert in 2011 saying “Be wary of any
advertisements or sales literature suggesting that reverse convertibles are safe
and suitable for investors seeking high yields. These sales pitches may play
up the high yield on the note and play down the risk of the derivative compo-
nent.” 14 Lastly, we need to consider brokers’ recommendations as well. As we
have seen in the case of lawsuits, brokers recommended these risky products to
elderly customers or a retired couple who explicitly preferred safe and stable
incomes to high-risk high-return investments. Given that these products offer
high fees to sellers, maybe brokers are over-recommending financial products
to their retail investors who are not suitable for this type of investment. See a
direct quote from a MarketWatch columnist: “What’s particularly egregious
about reverse convertibles is that they are being sold as a reasonably safe al-
ternative investment when, in fact, virtually all of the downside risk falls on
the buyer.” 15
Retail investors are considered to be more vulnerable than institutional
investors are so there are regulations in place to protect them. In the U.S. re-
verse convertible bond market, suitability standards and fiduciary duties are
13Source: The Seattle Times website. Available at https://www.seattletimes.com/
business/stupid-investment-of-the-week-reverse-convertible-securities/
14Source: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Available at https://www.
finra.org/investors/alerts/reverse-convertibles-complex-investment-vehicles
15Source: The Seattle Times website. Available at https://www.seattletimes.com/
business/stupid-investment-of-the-week-reverse-convertible-securities/
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required for financial advisers to sell reverse convertible bonds. First, brokers
are regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and are held
to a suitability standard, which states, “Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority Rule 2111 requires that a member or an associated person must have
a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based
on the information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member
or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment profile.” 16 Sec-
ond, investment advisers are regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and are held to the following fiduciary standard: “As fiduciaries,
investment advisers are required to act in the best interest of clients and to
not place their own interests ahead of their clients.” 17 In this regard, I’m
interested in whether these regulations are working or not. Are financial ad-
visers acting in the best interest of their clients or not? In other words, I’m
interested in whether there are agency problems or not. Furthermore, I’m also
interested in how severe agency problems are if there exist agency problems.
In addition, I also consider vertical incentives. In the reverse convertible
bond market, brokers not only sell their vertically integrated firm’s products
but they also sell their competitor’s products. For instance, JP Morgan brokers
not only sell JP Morgan bonds but they also sell UBS bonds. Does a JP
16Source: the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Available at https:
//www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111
17Source: Investment Adviser Association website. Available at https://www.
investmentadviser.org/home/side-content/sec-standard
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Morgan broker sell JP Morgan bonds in the same way he sells UBS bonds? Or
does he favor selling JP Morgan bonds compared to selling UBS bonds? The
arms-length transaction regulation which governs a vertical incentive structure
in this market requires JP Morgan brokers not to favor JP Morgan bonds
over UBS bonds. I’m also interested in whether the arms-length transaction
regulation is working or not. If it is not working, how severe are vertical
incentives in the market?
In order to answer these questions, I study the U.S. reverse convertible
bond market as its data show interesting variations. Before jumping into my
economic research questions, in this chapter, I document the reverse convert-
ible bonds and their pricing. Once I explain the institutional background, I
will explain what variations I use to answer the research questions in later
chapters.
1.1.2 Contributions to the Literature
A major contribution of this chapter is that it combines agency prob-
lems and vertical incentives. Egan (2019) also investigates agency problems
in the reverse convertible bond market. However, vertical incentives are not
considered in his paper. Due to data limitations, he assumes that there is
a representative broker. For instance, he assumes that a JP Morgan broker
behaves in the same way a UBS broker does. However, using data set on bro-
ker firms, I test this assumption and show evidence that a JP Morgan broker
behaves differently than a UBS broker does. In addition to combining agency
9
problems and vertical incentives, it is also related to structured products (Hen-
derson and Pearson 2011; Szymanowska, Horst and Veld 2009; Bergstresser
2008; Benet, Giannetti, and Pissaris 2006; Stoimenov and Wilkens 2005) as
reverse convertible bonds belong to structured products. While the literature
focuses on how to calculate bond fair values or on documenting high fees in
the structured product markets, I focus on other economics questions such as
agency problems and vertical incentives.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the institutional backgrounds such as the product, market structure, and dis-
tribution process. Section 3 describes two data sets. In Section 4, I explain
how I calculate the fair value of each bond. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 U.S. Reverse Convertible Bonds Market
In this section, I first explain the product, reverse convertible bonds.
Next, I explain the market structure where three types of players are engaged.
Lastly, I provide an explanation of how these bonds are distributed.
1.2.1 Reverse Convertible Bond
A reverse convertible bond generally pays fixed interest rates during
the life of the bond, but it is tied to a performance of a particular single stock.
If the value of that stock falls by a large amount beyond a predetermined
trigger level, the bond principal is reduced to that low equity value. In this
case, the investor incurs a significant loss. In order to better understand
10
a reverse convertible bond, first consider the example of a one-year reverse
convertible bond issued by JP Morgan on 26 August 2008 shown in Table 1.1.
The maturity date is 28 August 2009 so the maturity is one year. A monthly
coupon is 10% and the underlying asset is an Apple stock price. The initial
share price is $173 and trigger share price $104 which corresponds to 60% of
the initial share price. Note that this is not a hypothetical bond. This is a
real example from my data set. If an investor believes the Apple stock price
will not fall by 40% but also does not believe it will increase significantly,
then the investor should consider buying this Apple-linked reverse convertible
bond instead of buying the Apple stock. When the bond was issued, the stock
price of Apple was $173, which is called the initial share price. Once the
investor purchases, she observes the share price of the underlying asset or the
Apple stock price on a daily basis and one of two scenarios can occur. In the
first scenario, the Apple stock price never closes below the trigger share price
during the life of the bond. As one can see from Table 1.1, the predetermined
trigger share price is $104, which is 60% of the initial share price. In this case,
the investor gets the full principal at maturity plus a 10% coupon received
before maturity, so the total return will be 10%. 18 The second scenario is
when the share price of the underlying asset ever closes below the trigger share
price. As long as it closes below the trigger share price at least once, the bond
investor’s principal is converted into equity and she receives a payoff, as shown
18Throughout the chapters, discounting is ignored since all the bonds analyzed are short-
term bonds.
11
in Figure 1.1. On the x-axis, it shows the Apple stock price at maturity and
on the y-axis, it shows how much a return the investor gets when converted in
terms of percentage. When the Apple stock price hits the trigger share price,
the investor receives one share of the Apple stock for every $173 (initial share
price) invested, which is now only worth $104. Thus, the investor incurs a
loss of 40% on the principal and receives a 10% coupon, so the total return is
-30%. Depending on the performance of the stock, the investor may recover
some of the loss or suffer even more loss, as shown in Figure 1.1. For example,
if the Apple stock price recovers back to the initial share price $173, then the
return for an investor would be 10%. On the other hand, if the Apple stock
price goes down below the trigger share price, then an investment loss would
be larger than 30%. Overall, compared to buying the Apple stock, the reverse
convertible bond provides downside protection up to 40%, but the investor is
giving up upside potential when the Apple stock price increases by more than
10%.
As seen from this example, reverse convertible bonds are interest-paying
bonds for which repayment of the principal is tied to the performance of an
underlying asset. You can also find the formal definition of structured notes
which is a broader concept encompassing reverse convertible bonds from the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: “Structured notes are securities
issued by financial institutions whose returns are based on, among other things,
equity indexes, a single equity security, a basket of equity securities, interest
12
rates, commodities, and/or foreign currencies.” 19 In this example, the Apple
stock served as an underlying asset, but other stocks could also serve as an
underlying asset. The ten most popular underlying assets are presented in
Table 1.2. An Apple stock is the most frequent underlying asset followed by
a Bank of America stock and a Caterpillar stock. Note that when a financial
institution serves as an underlying asset, it does not necessarily mean the
financial institution is an issuer of a bond. For instance, JP Morgan ranks 5th
in the ten most popular underlying assets list. This does not necessarily mean
that JP Morgan issued a bond that is linked to the performance of a JP Morgan
stock price. It could be that UBS issued a reverse convertible bond that is
linked to the performance of a JP Morgan stock price. The same argument
applies to Bank of America and Citigroup. Using this information, I add equity
fixed effects in later chapters for the ten most popular underlying assets and
the rest. For instance, investors who invest in General Electric Company linked
reverse convertible bonds can be fundamentally different from investors who
invest in Freeport-Mcmoran Inc. linked reverse convertible bonds. In that
case, equity fixed effects will control for these differences.
Lastly, there are two types of reverse convertible bonds: single obser-
vation and continuous observation. The example with the Apple stock price
above shows a case of a continuous observation type. While we observe the
stock price on a daily basis for continuous observation bonds, we observe the
19Source: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website. Available at https:
//www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_structurednotes.html
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stock price only at maturity for single observation bonds. This is why we call
them single observation and continuous observation. Everything else equal, a
continuous observation bonds are riskier for an investor than is a single ob-
servation bond. Imagine a stock price hits a trigger share price during the
life of a bond and then it recovers to some extent but it is still lower than an
initial share price at maturity. In this scenario, an investor for a continuous
observation bond loses some of her principal as the stock price closes below
an initial share price at the maturity date. On the other hand, an investor
for a single observation type does not lose any part of her principal as a stock
price at maturity date is higher than a trigger share price. Other than this
case, an investor receives the same payoff from both types of bonds. In my
data set, continuous observation bonds are more commonly seen than single
observation bonds.
1.2.2 Market Structure
In terms of market structure, as shown in Figure 1.2, there are three
types of players in the reverse convertible bonds market: upstream issuers,
downstream broker firms, and retail investors. The upstream issuers create
and issue reverse convertible bonds to earn issuer markups (4.61% on average
in my data set). Barclays, UBS, and JP Morgan operate as issuers, and they
are responsible for more than 80% of bond issuance. They sell bonds with the
aid of downstream broker firms, who observe all the reverse convertible bonds
and market bonds directly to their retail investors. For instance, a JP Morgan
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broker firm not only sells JP Morgan-issued bonds but also UBS-issued bonds.
They earn broker fees (2.24% on average in my data set) when they sell the
bonds. One thing to note is that each bond has its own broker fee which
applies to all brokers in the market. For instance, Bond 1 can have a broker
fee of 2%, and Bond 2 can have a broker fee of 5%. However, conditional
on Bond 1, a 2% broker fee applies to every broker in the market. For the
same bond, a JP Morgan issuer is not allowed to pay 5% to a JP Morgan
broker firm while paying only 2% to a UBS broker firm. The group of broker
firms that are not affiliated with any issuer is called third-party brokers. For
example, Edward Jones operates in the downstream broker firms market but
does not engage in the upstream issuers market. I denote them by “Others”
in Figure 1.2. Consumers are retail investors who receive coupons (10.51%
on average in my data set). Typically, they are affluent households. The
Royal Bank of Canada’s guidelines restricted reverse convertible bond sales to
investors with the following profile: 1) $100,000 or more in annual income, 2)
at least $100,000 in liquid assets, 3) a net worth of $250,000 or more, 4) at
least two years of prior investment experience. 20 They buy and hold bonds.
As seen in Figure 1.2, Barclays, UBS, and JP Morgan all operate in the
upstream and downstream markets, so one might expect vertical relationships
between two units of the same firm. However, the arms-length transaction rule
governs the relationships between upstream firms and downstream firms, as
20Source: StarTribune website. Available at https://www.startribune.com/
buy-a-reverse-convertible-sure-what-is-it/301260161/
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follows: “Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Rule 2232 (f) (3): ‘arms-
length transaction’ shall mean a transaction that was conducted through a
competitive process in which non-affiliate firms could also participate, and
where the affiliate relationship did not influence the price paid or proceeds
received by the member.” 21 In other words, the arms-length transaction
regulation requires that upstream issuers and downstream broker firms must
operate independently even if they are vertically integrated. For instance, a
JP Morgan broker firm is required to do business with a JP Morgan issuer in
the same way they do business with a UBS issuer.
1.2.3 Distribution Process
The distribution process of bonds is described in Figure 1.3 using the
same example I used when explaining the product. Coupon (10.00%), broker
fee (2.89%), underlying asset (Apple) and trigger share price (60%) are set in
advance by an issuer (JP Morgan issuer). Note that each bond may have a
different broker fee, but one broker fee applies to all the broker firms that sell
it. For instance, a JP Morgan issuer is not allowed to pay a high broker fee
to a JP Morgan broker firm while paying a lower broker fee to a UBS broker
firm for the same bond. A marketing period is usually one month, and this
bond was issued in August 2008, which indicates that the marketing started in
July 2008. Over the course of the month, brokers at each broker firm market
21Source: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority is a non-governmental organization that regulates member brokerage firms.
Available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2232
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available reverse convertible bonds to their retail investors. Note that not only
a JP Morgan broker firm markets this bond but other broker firms such as a
Barclays broker firm or a UBS broker firm also market this bond. After one
month, all of the orders are summed up so that the size of a reverse convertible
bond exactly matches consumer demand. In this case, total consumer demand
is $1,186,000. This means the supply curve is very elastic. For regulatory
reasons, issuers sell reverse convertible bonds only through brokers rather than
selling them directly to consumers. 22
1.3 Data
This section describes two data sets. The first data set covers informa-
tion on reverse convertible bonds and the second data set covers information
on broker firms in the market.
1.3.1 Data on Reverse Convertible Bonds
The first data set covers every one-year maturity reverse convertible
bond issued in 2008-2012 in the U.S. registered with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (3,066 observations). 23 Issuance data are from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Form 424B filings, and the database in-
cludes coupon, broker fee, underlying asset, trigger share price, issuer, note
identifier, issue date/maturity date, and bond size. This data set is supple-
22The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regulations such as the 1933 Securities
Act restrict the marketing of financial products to retail investors.
23Egan (2019) has graciously shared his data on reverse convertible bonds.
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mented with equity volatility data from Option Metrics and credit default
swap, interest rates swap data from Bloomberg.
1.3.2 Data on Broker Firms
In the first data set, the data limitation is that one can only observe
overall market level bond sizes and one does not observe how much each broker
firm sells of each bond. To resolve this problem, I combine the first data with
a second data set which provides information on the size of each broker firm.
Specifically, the second data set includes the number of investment advisers
employed by each broker firm on a yearly basis (2007-2015). 24 Overall,
there are 32,178 broker firms and 2,703,637 observations. 25 From this, I
make a list of 29 broker firms that sell reverse convertible bonds, as shown in
Table 1.3. Each broker firm in the list is identified as a broker firm that sells
reverse convertible bonds. As explained previously, the list includes a Barclays
broker firm, a UBS broker firm, and a JP Morgan broker firm. A broker firm
such as Edward Jones engages in the downstream broker firm market but
does not issue reverse convertible bonds. These 29 broker firms constitute
the downstream broker firms in the industry and employ 115,514 investment
advisers on average each year, which accounts for 38.5% of all investment
advisers in the market. Next, I construct a variable called a share of brokers
which measures the relative number of investment advisers employed by each
24Egan, Matvos, Seru (2018) have graciously shared their data on broker firms.
25Source: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investment Adviser Public
Disclosure (IAPD) website. Available at https://adviserinfo.sec.gov/
18
broker firm as shown in Table 1.4. Each row shows each broker firm and each
column shows the year of which the data is used. For instance, UBS Financial
Services Inc. employed 8.38% of all the investment advisers selling reverse
convertible bonds in 2012. When a number is higher, then it means a broker
firm has a larger presence in the market in a given year.
1.4 Reverse Convertible Bond Pricing
In this section, I explain reverse convertible bond pricing. I start with
a general approach. Then I provide a numerical example using a real data
point. Next, I show summary statistics which includes information obtained
by fair value calculation. Lastly, I calculate the probability of hitting a barrier
for two different types of bonds.
1.4.1 General Approach
Information on coupons and broker fees is directly from the data but
the challenge is that an issuer markup, i.e. how much an issuer earns by
issuing a bond, is unknown. Thus, in order to calculate an issuer markup, I
calculate the risk (fair value) of each bond by a replicating portfolio. This tells
us how much an issuer receives by hedging the position on the date they issue
a bond. To start with, by investing in a reverse convertible bond, an investor
effectively enters a sell position of an equity put option. As seen in Figure 1.4,
a broker firm does not take any positions and transfer it to an issuer. An
investor has a sell position which means an issuer enters a buy position. In
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order to hedge, an issuer sells an equity option in the equity options market.
The key question is how much an issuer receives by selling an equity option.
Equity option prices are calculated according to Black and Scholes (1973) for a
single observation type and according to Reiner and Rubinstein (1991a, 1991b)
for a continuous observation type. Reiner and Rubinstein (1991a, 1991b)
provide analytical forms for equity option prices of a continuous observation
type. While implementing this, I assume that each underlying equity pays a
constant dividend. Once the fair value is calculated, the difference between
the risk (fair value) and the sum of coupon and broker fee is defined as an
issuer markup. This is because the fair value is what an issuer receives by
hedging the position while coupon and broker fee are what an issuer pays to
an investor and a broker, respectively. Additionally, I also use the information
on credit default swaps and interest rates swaps to account for the default risk
of issuers.
1.4.2 Numerical Example
A numerical example of a reverse convertible bond pricing is provided
using an example from Table 1.5. The bond is issued by a JP Morgan issuer on
trade date 20 April 2012. The maturity date is 26 April 2013 which is one year
from the trade date. A monthly coupon is 9.10% and the underlying asset is a
Las Vegas Sands Corp stock price. A Las Vegas Sands Corp stock price is $58
when the bond is issued and the predetermined trigger share price is $40 which
is 70% of the initial share price. A good benchmark to start with is the coupon
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yield without an equity option. A traditional bond issued by JP Morgan for
the same trade date and maturity date pays investors 0.89%. Information
on credit default swaps and interest rates swaps is used to obtain the value.
The coupon difference between the reverse convertible bond 9.10% and the
traditional bond 0.89% must come from an equity option premium. On trade
date, 20 April 2012, the stock price of Las Vegas Sands Corp was $58. By
selling an equity option, the investor receives an option premium. At option
expiry date or maturity date, the investor is fully protected as long as the stock
price stays above $40 as this is a single observation type bond. Once it hits
$40, the investor loses 30% of her principal and her loss becomes even larger as
the stock price goes down further down the road. This type of option is called
a knock-in put option. Reiner and Rubinstein (1991a, 1991b) provide a tool for
knock-in put option pricing. Based on the market conditions on the trade date,
20 April 2012, the option premium is trading at 12.40%. Now we are ready to
calculate an issuer markup. By purchasing this bond, the investor is effectively
taking two risks: a JP Morgan credit risk and a Las Vegas Sands Corp equity
option risk. The market assesses them as 13.29% (= 0.89%+12.40%), and the
bond pays a coupon of 9.10% so 4.19% (= 13.29% − 9.10%) is a joint seller’s
margin for an issuer and a broker. The broker fee is fully disclosed and it is
2.00% so an issuer markup is 2.19% (= 4.19% − 2.00%). The seller’s margin
breakdown is summarized in Table 1.6. Risk (fair value) is 13.29% which is
calculated by equity option pricing. Coupon 9.10% and broker fee 2.00% are
directly from the first data set. So, the difference of 2.19% is an issuer markup
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for this bond. Similarly, I calculate an issuer markup for every bond in the
data set.
1.4.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the bonds are shown in Table 1.7 including
issuer markups. In order to calculate market shares, I define a market as the
universe of all reverse convertible bonds each month since the marketing period
is one month. Thus, the outside option is defined as the sum of all the reverse
convertible bonds other than those with a one-year maturity. Each month is
defined as a market and there are 5 years’ data so there are 60 markets in the
data. We have 3,066 observations and note that each observation corresponds
to each reverse convertible bond issued in the market. Thus, the average
number of bonds in each market is 51 and the average outside option share is
69.4%. The average bond pays a coupon of 10.51% with a standard deviation
of 2.84%. Broker fees are 2.24% on average with a standard deviation of 0.69%.
Issuer markups are on average 4.61% with a standard deviation of 6.43%. Note
that the number of observations for issuer markups is 2,684 as information on
credit default swaps is missing for some minor issuers. The risk or fair value
is 17.07% on average with a standard deviation of 6.90%. The mean size of
bonds is $1.44 million with a standard deviation of $2.20 million. One can
see that these are fairly small-sized bonds compared to bonds purchased by
institutional investors.
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1.4.4 Probability of Hitting a Barrier
As explained, a bond investor’s payoff depends on whether an underly-
ing asset price hits a barrier or not so one may be curious about the probability
of hitting a barrier for reverse convertible bonds. In this subsection, I derive
the probability of hitting a barrier for two types of reverse convertible bonds
- single observation vs. continuous observation. Out of 3,066 observations,
single observation types accounts for 1,364 bonds while continuous observa-
tion types accounts for 1,702 bonds. First of all, for single observation reverse
convertible bonds, we observe an underlying stock price only once at matu-
rity. If the stock price is trading at equal or lower than the predetermined
trigger share price, a bond investor incurs a huge loss in the principal. Using
the Black-Scholes equity option pricing model, I calculate the probability of
hitting a barrier for single observation types which is equivalent to calculating
the probability that an equity put option will be exercised. The results show
that the probability of hitting a barrier for single observation types is 0.28 on
average. The median value is 0.29 and the histogram is shown in Figure 1.5.
On the x-axis, it shows the probability of hitting a barrier and on the y-axis,
it shows the number of bonds. Roughly speaking, investors investing in sin-
gle observation type reverse convertible bonds incur a significant loss on their
principal with probability 0.28 and they receive a high return with probabil-
ity 0.72 without any loss in their principal. Again, this shows that reverse
convertible bonds are high-risk high-return products.
Next, for continuous observation reverse convertible bonds, we observe
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an underlying stock price on a daily basis until maturity. If the stock price ever
touches the predetermined trigger share price for any given day during the life
of a bond, a principal is converted into equity. Using the Reiner and Rubinstein
equity option pricing model, I calculate the probability of hitting a barrier for
continuous observation types. In other words, I calculate the probability of an
underlying stock price ever hitting the predetermined trigger share price during
the life of a bond when observed on a daily basis. The exercise shows that
the probability of hitting a barrier for continuous observation types is 0.57 on
average. The median value is 0.58 and the histogram is shown in Figure 1.6.
On the x-axis, it shows the probability of hitting a barrier and on the y-
axis, it shows the number of bonds. Roughly speaking, investors investing in
continuous observation type reverse convertible bonds are expected to witness
their principal converting into equity with probability 0.57 and it is expected
that their principal does not convert into equity with probability 0.43. Unlike
a single observation type case, we need to be cautious when interpreting this
result as this does not mean investors incur a loss in their principal with a
probability of 0.57. Even when an underlying stock price hits a barrier and
the principal is converted into equity, investors still enjoy a positive or high
return when the stock price recovers before the maturity. This scenario is
included in the probability of 0.57. Overall, I believe these two exercises show




In this chapter, I document the institutional backgrounds of the reverse
convertible bonds market. A reverse convertible bond has a complex payoff
scheme so I explain it with a real example which is one observation from
the data set. In terms of market structure, there are upstream issuers who
issue bonds and downstream broker firms who buy bonds from issuers and
sell them to investors. It is noteworthy that some issuers and brokers are
financially integrated. Economic questions related to vertical incentives will
be discussed in later chapters. The distribution process is also documented
in this chapter whose industry model will be presented in the third chapter.
The data on reverse convertible bonds are described and using the data set,
I calculate the fair value of each bond by which I derive an issuer markup.
This enables me to back out how much profit each issuer earns by issuing a
bond. This variable plays a critical role in investigating vertical incentives in
the market in later chapters. Finally, I discuss the summary statistics of my







Underlying Asset Apple Inc.
Initial Share Price $173
Trigger Share Price $104 (60%)
Table 1.1: Reverse Convertible Bond Example
26
Rank Underlying Asset Number of Bonds
1 Apple Inc. 198
2 Bank of America Corporation 97
3 Caterpillar Inc. 78
4 General Electric Company 75
5 JP Morgan Chase & Co 75
6 Freeport-Mcmoran Inc. 70
7 United States Steel Corporation 62
8 Ford Motor Company 53
9 Alpha Natural Resources Inc. 51
10 Citigroup Inc. 48
Table 1.2: The Most Popular Underlying Assets
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ABN AMRO Asset Management, Inc.
Ameriprise Advisor Services, Inc.
Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc.
Barclays Capital Inc.
Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
BMO Harris Financial Advisors, Inc.
Capitol Securities Management, Inc.
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Edward Jones
Ferris, Baker Watts, LLC
H&R Block Financial Advisors, Inc.
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
Landolt Securities, Inc.
Lehman Brothers Inc.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.
Morgan Stanley
Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC
Raymond James Financial Services
RBC Capital Markets Corp
Santander Securities
TD Ameritrade, Inc.
UBS Financial Services Inc.
Wachovia Securities, LLC
Wells Fargo Investments, LLC
Table 1.3: List of 29 Broker Firms Who Sell Reverse Convertible Bonds
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Barclays Capital Inc. 0.00% 0.45% 0.50% 0.50% 0.53% 0.40%
UBS Financial Services Inc. 9.19% 8.87% 8.01% 8.10% 8.38% 8.51%
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC 0.53% 0.91% 0.95% 0.96% 1.03% 0.88%
Others 90.28% 89.77% 90.54% 90.44% 90.06% 90.21%






Underlying Asset Las Vegas Sands Corp
Initial Share Price $58
Trigger Share Price $40 (70%)
Table 1.5: Reverse Convertible Bond Pricing Example
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Risk (Fair Value) 13.29% (=0.89%+12.40%)
Coupon 9.10%
Seller’s Margin (Issuer Markup/Broker Fee) 4.19% (=13.29%-9.10%)
Broker Fee 2.00%
Issuer Markup 2.19% (=4.19%-2.00%)
Table 1.6: Seller’s Margin Breakdown
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Number of markets: 60
Number of total bonds: 3,066
Number of bonds each market: 51
% of outside option: 69.4%
Observations Mean Stdev
Coupon (c) 3,066 10.51% 2.84%
Broker Fee (κ) 3,066 2.24% 0.69%
Issuer Markup (η) 2,684 4.61% 6.43%
Risk (Fair Value) (v) 2,684 17.07% 6.90%
Size (in USD millions) 3,066 1.44mm 2.20mm
Table 1.7: Summary Statistics
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Figure 1.1: Reverse Convertible Bond Payoff If Converted (Scenario 2)
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Figure 1.2: Market Structure
34
Figure 1.3: Distribution Process
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Figure 1.4: Hedging Through Equity Option Market
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Figure 1.5: Probability of Hitting a Barrier for Single Observation Type
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Figure 1.6: Probability of Hitting a Barrier for Continuous Observation Type
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Chapter 2
Agency Problems and Vertical Incentives:




In many cases, consumers rely on experts when they select a prod-
uct. In financial markets, for instance, investors seek financial advice from
brokers. Similarly, in prescription drug markets, physicians prescribe drugs
for their patients. However, experts may have different incentives from those
of consumers, which is known as a conflict of interest. A further complica-
tion is that there are usually informational asymmetries between experts and
consumers. In other words, experts understand the products and markets bet-
ter than consumers, and so it is possible for them to steer their consumers
into certain products to maximize their own profits rather than taking care
of the consumers, creating agency problems. Thus, there are regulations that
have been imposed, such as requiring advisors to act as fiduciaries, to prevent
agency problems. In this chapter, I investigate agency problems in the context
of financial intermediaries. Specifically, I study agency problems by analyzing
financial brokers in the U.S. reverse convertible bonds market.
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The U.S. reverse convertible bonds market is explained and documented
in the first chapter. In observing the market, one may notice that this product
has caused many problems for retail investors. In 2016, UBS Financial Services
paid $15 million to settle charges in connection with the sale of reverse convert-
ible bonds, as 8,700 retail investors were given unsuitable recommendations
of the bonds. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission mentioned that
it failed to adequately educate and train its sales force about certain complex
financial products it sold to retail investors. 1 In 2015, RBC Capital Markets
also paid a $1 million fine for supervisory failures resulting in sales of unsuit-
able reverse convertible bonds to its retail investors. 2 In 2011, Wells Fargo
Investments was fined $2 million for unsuitable reverse convertible bond sales
to elderly customers. 3 In 2010, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
fined H&R Block Financial Advisors $200,000 for failing to establish adequate
procedures for supervising sales of reverse convertible bonds to its retail in-
vestors. 4 It is hard to imagine that a high-risk, high-return product like
a reverse convertible bond is a suitable product for senior citizens or retired
couples, who should prefer stable and modest sources of income. However,
1Source: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website. Available at https:
//www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-197.html
2Source: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Avail-
able at https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2015/
finra-orders-rbc-pay-fine-and-restitution-totaling-more-14-million
3Source: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Avail-
able at https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2011/
finra-fines-wells-fargo-2-million-unsuitable-sales-reverse-convertibles
4The MarketWatch website. Available at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
regulator-fines-hr-block-200k-for-poor-controls-2010-02-16
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brokers at Wells Fargo Investments recommended and sold reverse convertible
bonds to senior citizens who were over 80 years old and brokers at H&R Block
Financial Advisors sold them to a retired couple.
An immediate question one might have is why retail investors are buy-
ing reverse convertible bonds. A reverse convertible bond pays a particular
type of payoff, so some investors may prefer them depending on their portfo-
lios. Another reason could be that retail investors are misled by high coupons,
especially in a low-yield environment. From the data set used in this chapter,
reverse convertible bonds pay 10.51% coupons on average, which may appear
attractive to retail investors. However, although it pays a high coupon, the
total return can be negative if the underlying asset price falls. A bond investor
receives a high return only when the underlying asset price remains high. A
relevant article titled “Risky Strategy Lures Investors Seeking Yield - Popular
‘Reverse Convertibles’ Offer Lucrative Payouts But Could Cause Steep Losses”
was published in the Wall Street Journal in 2008. 5 In addition, this product
has a complex structure, so it may be hard for retail investors to value the risk
associated with it. A 10.51% coupon may seem attractive, but it also bears a
significant risk; however, retail investors may not be sophisticated enough to
properly evaluate that risk. For example, in order to assess the risk, one needs
to calculate the fair value of the bonds using the Black-Scholes option pricing
model, which is not something many retail investors will be in a position to
5Source: The Wall Street Journal website. Available at https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB120648718371963833
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understand and apply when they are making their investment decisions. Rec-
ommendations by brokers must also be considered. From the data set used in
this chapter, the seller’s margins for reverse convertible bonds are almost 7%
on average, so it is possible for brokers to recommend these products in order
to earn high commissions or fees. While it may seem difficult to understand
why retail investors would buy these bonds, there are many retail investors
who engage in this market. In terms of market size, this bond market exceeded
10 billion dollars in the U.S. and over 50 billion dollars globally in 2008. 6 Even
though retail investors are active in this market, the product has a complex
structure that is hard to understand.
In the reverse convertible bond market, it is not surprising that retail
investors mainly rely on financial advisers to decide which product to purchase
since the products have such a complex structure. In order to sell reverse con-
vertible bonds in the US, one needs to possess either a broker’s or investment
adviser’s license. Brokers are regulated by the Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority and are held to a suitability standard, which states, “Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority Rule 2111 requires that a member or an as-
sociated person must have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended
transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable
for the customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable
diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain the customer’s in-
6Laise (2008), Alloway (2015)
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vestment profile.” 7 Meanwhile, investment advisers are regulated by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and are held to the following fiduciary
standard: “As fiduciaries, investment advisers are required to act in the best
interest of clients and to not place their own interests ahead of their clients.”
8 If brokers behave as the regulations require, one may believe that they are
giving the best possible advice regarding this set of products. However, there
is a conflict of interest that can arise in this market. The data set considered
in this chapter shows that a lower coupon is associated with a higher broker fee
on average, holding everything else fixed, which suggests that a bond whose
product characteristics are less attractive to retail investors may pay higher
fees to brokers.
As there are many issues regarding the bond sales practices of various
broker firms, it is questionable whether existing regulations are accomplishing
their desired goals. Thus, a natural question that arises is whether the advice
investors get from their brokers is affected by their conflicting incentives. In
other words, we want to understand whether there are agency problems or
not in the reverse convertible bond market. If brokers appear to follow the
relevant regulations and try to act in the best interests of their investors, then
one does not need to be overly concerned about this market. Otherwise, this
may be an area that needs more regulation.
7Source: the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority website. Available at https:
//www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111
8Source: Investment Adviser Association website. Available at https://www.
investmentadviser.org/home/side-content/sec-standard
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In addition to agency problems, vertical incentives may also affect
agency problems if brokers are vertically integrated with their upstream firms.
For instance, in this market, JP Morgan brokers not only sell JP Morgan-issued
products but also UBS-issued products, and they may behave differently de-
pending on which products they are selling. Although arms-length transaction
regulations exist in the market, which requires that vertical relationships not
influence broker activities, brokers may have incentives to consider their ver-
tically integrated firm’s profits. As expected, using two data sets, I show that
brokers are sensitive to the markups of their vertically integrated upstream
firm.
2.1.2 Contributions to the Literature
This chapter contributes to the vertical integration literature by com-
bining agency problems and vertical integration (Crawford, Lee, Whinston and
Yurukoglu 2018). While Crawford, Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu (2018) an-
alyze vertical integration only, this chapter shows that vertical incentives and
agency problems both affect financial broker activities. Also, it is related to
the topic of price dispersion in financial markets (Choi, Laibson and Madrian
2010; Hortacsu and Syverson 2004; Massa 2000; Green and Hollifield 1992)
by discussing two identical financial products with different prices. It is also
related to structured products (Henderson and Pearson 2011; Szymanowska,
Horst and Veld 2009; Bergstresser 2008; Benet, Giannetti and Pissaris 2006;
Stoimenov and Wilkens 2005) as reverse convertible bonds belong to struc-
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tured products. Lastly, it is related to consideration sets (Crawford, Griffith
and Iaria 2016; Goeree 2008) by showing brokers limit the available financial
products offered to their investors.
In this chapter, I mainly document stylized facts using a reduced-form
analysis. One can see that there is suggestive evidence of agency problems
and vertical incentives. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 shows there exists a conflict of interest
in the market. In Section 4, I show some evidence of agency problems while
in Section 5, I show evidence of vertical incentives. Section 6 concludes the
chapter.
2.2 Data
Two data sets used in this chapter are described in the first chapter.
2.3 Conflict of Interest
If higher broker fees are associated with low coupons after controlling
for other characteristics, then this suggests a conflict of interest since bonds
that are less attractive to investors pay higher fees to brokers. In order to test
this, I consider the following equation.
couponj = β
a
0 broker feej + β
a
1 riskj + β
a
2 controlsj + ε
a
j , (2.1)
where j indexes each bond and we are interested in whether or not
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β a0 < 0. For controls, I add a dummy variable for continuous observation,
market fixed effects, issuer fixed effects, and equity fixed effects. First of all,
there are two types of reverse convertible bonds - single observation and con-
tinuous observation. By adding a dummy variable for a continuous observation
which equals to 1 if a continuous observation or 0 otherwise, I control for two
types of reverse convertible bonds. Secondly, each month is defined as a dif-
ferent market. If a market shock makes this month fundamentally different
from the previous month, then the market fixed effects will control for that.
Thirdly, for example, investors who purchase JP Morgan-issued bonds may
be fundamentally different from investors who buy UBS-issued bonds. In this
case, issuer fixed effects will control for that. Lastly, if investors who purchase
Apple stock-linked bonds are fundamentally different from those who purchase
IBM stock-linked bonds, then equity fixed effects can control for that.
The results are presented in Table 2.1 where I add market fixed effects
and issuer fixed effects for the first specification and I add equity fixed effects
additionally for the second specification. There are 2,684 observations for both
specifications and the R-squared for the first specification is 0.1343 while the
R-squared for the second specification is 0.1799. The estimate on the broker fee
coefficient for the first specification is -0.1386 and the estimate on the broker
fee coefficient for the second specification is -0.1358. They suggest that higher
broker fees are associated with lower coupons on average, holding other factors
fixed. The signs of the coefficients are all negative and statistically significant.
In terms of magnitude, a 1 percentage point increase in broker fee is associated
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with a 0.14% decrease in coupon on average. The coefficient estimate on risk
is 0.2871 for the first specification and 0.2723 for the second specification.
Both of them are positive and statistically significant. When a bond is riskier,
investors demand a higher coupon, so this is in line with what we expect. The
coefficient estimate on a continuous observation dummy variable is 0.0024 for
the first specification and 0.0028 for the second specification. Both of them are
positive although statistically not significant. In sum, this shows that there is
a potential conflict of interest in these products.
One may also think about the relationship between a coupon and a
seller’s margin where a seller’s margin is defined as the sum of an issuer markup
and a broker fee. If an increase in the seller’s margin is associated with the
lower coupon, then this may also suggest a conflict of interest. However, the
sum of a coupon and a seller’s margin equals a fair value so this relationship
is mechanical. If I had run regressions controlling for fair values, then the
regressions suffer from the perfect multi-collinearity problem.
2.4 Testing Agency Problems
In this section, I test whether there are agency problems or not. The
first evidence of agency problems is that there exist strictly dominating and
dominated product pairs in the same market. Secondly, I show that high
broker fee products get sold more than low broker fee products do.
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2.4.1 Superior and Dominated Bond Pairs
Given that there is a conflict of interest, I now document suggestive
evidence of agency problems. 9 Table 2.2 compares two reverse convertible
bonds. Note that column (2) in the table shows the reverse convertible bond
that I presented as an example in the first chapter. CUSIP is a unique identifier
for each bond so different CUSIPs tell us they are two different bonds. A
JP Morgan issuer issued both bonds and trade date and maturity date are
the same 26 August 2008 and 28 August 2009, respectively. Face values are
the same (100 for both bonds) and underlying assets are the same Apple
stock. Moreover, the initial share price and trigger share price are the same
$173 and $104, respectively. However, the coupon is not the same. This is
surprising as this tells us that there is another bond that has the same product
characteristics but with a higher coupon, as shown in column (1). I call the
bond with a higher coupon a superior bond and the bond with a lower coupon
a dominated bond. Superior and dominated bonds are cheap and expensive
versions, respectively, of otherwise identical bonds. Superior and dominated
bonds not only have the same product characteristics but also have the same
issuer, and most importantly, they are sold on the same trade date. Since
superior bond and dominated bond share the same product characteristics
other than the coupon, risks are the same 14.12%. But one may notice that
the dominated bond pays a lower coupon but a higher broker fee and a higher
issuer markup in Table 2.2. This, again, shows a conflict of interest as we
9The analysis in this subsection is very similar to Egan (2019).
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discussed in the previous section. Comparing the sizes of the two bonds, the
dominated bond with a higher broker fee was sold 20 times more frequently
than the superior bond with a low broker fee. This suggests informational
frictions since no investor would ever prefer the dominated bond over the
superior bond. This also suggests agency problems as no broker would offer
the dominated bond if he were to maximize investor profit alone.
Another interesting example is shown in Table 2.3. This time a UBS
issuer issues 7 different bonds on the same trade date 27 March 2012 with the
same maturity date 4 April 2012. ISIN is a unique identifier for each bond,
similar to CUSIP. Different ISINs show they are different bonds. Face values
are both 100 and they have the same underlying asset of a Hewlett-Packard
stock price. Initial share prices are the same at $23.62 and trigger share prices
are also the same at $20.08. However, not all coupons are the same. Bond 1
and Bond 2 pay the highest coupon as 8.32% while Bond 6 and Bond 7 pay
the lowest coupon as 8.06%. Bond 3, Bond 4 and Bond 5 pay coupons lower
than Bond 1 and Bond 2 do but higher than Bond 6 and Bond 7 do. In other
words, investors who invest in these bonds all take the same risks but returns
are not the same.
Previous two examples are not just anecdotal cases, as superior and
dominated bond pairs are observed repeatedly in the data set. I extend a
similar analysis of Table 2.2 to all superior and dominated bond pairs, which
account for 244 bonds out of 3,066 bonds (8.0%) in my data, as shown in
Table 2.4. Superior bonds pay 10.76% coupon while dominated bonds pay
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9.65% coupon on average. Superior bond coupon is higher than dominated
bond coupon by definition. As superior and dominated bond pairs share the
same product characteristics, risks are the same, 18.89% on average. The
broker fee of superior bonds is 1.46% while the broker fee of dominated bonds
is 2.16% on average. As expected, the average broker fee of dominated bonds
is higher than the average broker fee of superior bonds. The issuer markup
of superior bonds is 6.69% on average while the average issuer markup of
dominated bonds is 7.08%. Similarly, issuers make more profit by issuing
dominated bonds compared to issuing superior bonds. Finally, the average
size of superior bonds is $578k while the average size of dominated bonds is
$733k. In sum, low coupon-paying dominated bonds offer higher broker fees
and they not only get sold but they get sold more than superior bonds do
on average. Another point worth mentioning is that dominated bonds are
not offered by one specific issuer. To the contrary, all three major issuers -
Barclays, UBS, JP Morgan - issue and sell dominated bonds.
2.4.2 High Fee Products vs. Low Fee Products
Next, we compare high broker fee products and low broker fee prod-
ucts. After we control for the sum of issuer markups and broker fees (I will
call this the seller’s margin), broker fees should not affect demand for bonds
because they simply show a division of surplus between issuers and brokers.
For instance, when an issuer markup is 5% and a broker fee is 2%, what in-
vestors care about will be the sum 7%. After we control for 7%, investors will
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not be affected by a 2% broker fee, as this only shows how issuers and broker
firms split their margins. In this spirit, consider the regression below where
we control for coupon and risk (fair value), which means we control for the
sum of issuer markup and broker fee. If we add broker fee into the regression
after controlling for coupon, risk (fair value) and controls, it should not affect
bond sales theoretically.
bond salesj = β
b
0 broker feej + β
b
1 couponj + β
b
2 riskj + β
b
3 controlsj + ε
b
j (2.2)
Here bond salesj is the size of bond j and the main question is whether
or not β b0 > 0. Note that a bond issuance practice in the reverse convert-
ible bond market is different from that of bonds issued targeting institutional
investors. When financial institutions issue a bond targeting institutional in-
vestors, they usually set a bond size in advance. This means a bond size, how
much an issuer wants to issue, is one of the product characteristics. However,
as we have seen in the first chapter, issuers in the reverse convertible bond
market do not fix bond sizes in advance. Instead, they fix an issuer markup
in advance and issue a bond which perfectly matches demand. This practice
enables me to run the regression considered here. For controls, I add a dummy
variable for continuous observation to account for two different types of bonds
- single observation and continuous observation. I also add issuer fixed effects,
and equity fixed effects. If investors investing in bonds issued by different
issuers are fundamentally different, then issuer fixed effects will control for
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that. If investors investing in bonds linked to different underlying assets are
fundamentally different, then equity fixed effects will control for that. The
fixed effects regression results are presented in Table 2.5. The difference be-
tween the first column and the second column is whether you add equity fixed
effects or not. The coefficient estimate on the broker fee is 14.6428 for the
first specification and 14.5114 for the second specification. This means that
in all specifications, broker fees positively affect bond sales or demand in a
statistically significant way after controlling for the product characteristics.
In terms of magnitude, when a broker fee increases by 1 percentage point,
there is a 15% increase in a bond sales on average. The coefficient estimate on
the coupon is 1.6450 under the first specification while it is 2.0654 under the
second specification. Everything else equal, higher coupons will attract more
investors so this is expected. Both estimates are statistically significant. The
coefficient estimate on risk is -0.7071 for the first specification and -0.6761 for
the second specification. Likewise, riskier bonds will attract fewer investors on
average so both signs are expected. They are also statistically significant. The
estimate on a continuous observation dummy variable is -1.3932 for the first
specification and -1.4018 for the second specification. We have 2,684 observa-
tions in total for both specifications. The R-squared for the first specification
is 0.4326 and the R-squared for the second specification is 0.4357. One could
interpret the results as indicating that brokers recommend high broker fee
products more often, meaning these products get more exposure to investors
(which yields higher demand). The results that high broker fee bonds get sold
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more than low broker fee bonds on average suggest agency problems, espe-
cially when coupled with previous results that higher broker fee products are
associated with low coupons.
2.5 Testing Vertical Incentives
In this section, I test whether there are vertical incentives in the supply
chain or not. First, I show that vertical relationships affect bond sales. Second,
I also show that vertical relationships affect upstream firm pricing.
2.5.1 Share of Brokers vs. Bond Sales
I show some evidence of vertical incentives between upstream issuers
and downstream brokers. First, consider downstream broker activities. If
there were no vertical relationships, which are required by the arms-length
transaction regulation, the share of brokers at a vertically integrated down-
stream firm should not affect the demand for bonds issued by an upstream
firm. For example, the share of brokers at the downstream UBS broker firm
should not affect demand for the upstream UBS-issued bonds if there were no
vertical incentives. To test vertical incentives based on this logic, I consider
the following regression equation.
bond salesj = β
c
0 broker feej + β
c
1 share of brokersj + β
c
2 couponj + β
c
3 riskj





where share of brokersj is the relative number of brokers at a down-
stream broker firm that is vertically integrated with an issuer who issues bond
j. Based on the regressions we considered in the previous section, we add this
new variable share of brokers. If there are no vertical incentives, then β c1 will
be close to zero. For controls, I add a continuous observation dummy variable,
issuer fixed effects, and equity fixed effects. The fixed effects regressions are
presented in Table 2.6. Equity fixed effects are not added in the first fixed
effects regression while they are added in the second fixed effects regression.
The coefficient estimate on the share of brokers is 6.9244 for the first speci-
fication and 6.9831 for the second specification. They are both positive and
statistically significant after controlling for coupon, risk (fair value), broker
fee, and controls. In terms of magnitude, when the share of brokers increases
by 1 percentage point, there is a 7% increase in a bond sales. The coefficient
estimate on the broker fee is 19.9427 under the first specification while it is
19.7750 under the second specification. The results are in line with the results
in Table 2.5 as broker fees positively affect bond sales. The coefficient estimate
on coupon is 2.1834 without equity fixed effects and 2.5310 with equity fixed
effects. They are positive and statistically significant as expected. The esti-
mate on the risk coefficient is -0.6954 for the first column while it is -0.6634 for
the second column. They are negative and statistically significant as investors
prefer less risk, holding others fixed. The estimate on the continuous observa-
tion coefficient is -1.4923 for the first specification and -1.5047 for the second
specification. 2,542 observations are used in regressions and the R-squared is
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0.4369 for the first column while it is 0.4410 for the second column. What
we learn from this exercise is that the variable share of brokers positively af-
fects bond sales after controlling for others. One can interpret the results as
the downstream brokers attempting to sell more of their vertically integrated
upstream parent firm’s products compared to their vertically non-integrated
upstream competitor firm’s products. In other words, this suggests that a JP
Morgan broker firm tries to sell more of JP Morgan issued bonds compared to
UBS issued bonds all else equal.
2.5.2 Upstream Price-Setting
In this subsection, consider price-setting behaviors of upstream issuers.
If there were no vertical relationships, which is a requirement under the arms-
length transaction regulation, the share of brokers at vertically integrated
downstream firms should not affect price settings at upstream firms. For
instance, the share of brokers at the downstream UBS broker firm should not
affect how the upstream UBS issuer sets prices if there were no vertical rela-
tionships. Consider the following equations with multiple dependent variables:
coupon, broker fee, and issuer markup.
couponj = β
d
0 share of brokersj + β
d
1 riskj + β
d
2 controlsj + ε
d
j , (2.4)
broker feej = β
e
0 share of brokersj + β
e
1 riskj + β
e
2 controlsj + ε
e
j , (2.5)
issuer markupj = β
f
0 share of brokersj + β
f
1 riskj + β
f




where coefficients of interest are β d0 , β
e
0 , and β
f
0 . For controls, a dummy
variable for a continuous observation, issuer fixed effects, equity fixed effects
are added. The results of 6 fixed effects regressions are present in Table 2.7.
When a dependent variable is a coupon, the first and the second column show
the results without equity fixed effects and with equity fixed effects, respec-
tively. When a dependent variable is a broker fee, the third and the fourth
column show the results without equity fixed effects and with equity fixed ef-
fects, respectively. In the same manner, when a dependent variable is an issuer
markup, the fifth and the sixth column show the results without equity fixed
effects and with equity fixed effects, respectively.
With the dependent variable coupon, the coefficient estimate on the
share of brokers is -0.1277 for the first specification and -0.1080 for the sec-
ond specification. This means that when there is a higher share of brokers
downstream, upstream issuers set coupons low, or prices high. The coefficient
estimate on risk is 0.1448 for the first specification and 0.1171 for the second
specification. They are both statistically significant and they suggest higher
risks are compensated with higher coupons on average. The coefficient esti-
mate on the continuous observation variable is 0.0040 and 0.0063, respectively.
There are 2,542 observations in total. The R-squared is 0.1651 for the first
specification and it is 0.2381 for the second specification. With the dependent
variable broker fee, the coefficient estimate on the share of brokers is -0.0030
for the first specification and -0.0024 for the second specification. Both of
them are very small in terms of magnitude and they are not statistically sig-
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nificant. This means that when there is a higher or lower share of brokers
at the downstream market, upstream issuers change broker fees little. The
coefficient estimate on risk is -0.0000 for the first specification and -0.0019 for
the second specification. This shows that issuers do not change their broker
fee setting behaviors according to the riskiness of bonds. Neither of these
estimates are statistically significant. The coefficient estimate on the contin-
uous observation variable is 0.0090 and 0.0092, respectively. There are 2,542
observations in total. R-squared is 0.3368 for the first specification and it is
0.3439 for the second specification. Lastly, with the dependent variable issuer
markup, the coefficient estimate on the share of brokers is 0.1308 for the first
specification and 0.1105 for the second specification. This means that when
there is a higher share of brokers at the downstream market, upstream issuers
set issuer markups high. In other words, they set their margins high when they
have better distribution channels. The coefficient estimate on risk is 0.8551
for the first specification and 0.8848 for the second specification. These esti-
mates suggest that issuers earn higher markups when they issue riskier bonds.
The coefficient estimate on the continuous observation variable is -0.0131 and
-0.0156, respectively. There are 2,542 observations in total. The R-squared is
0.8503 for the first specification and it is 0.8629 for the second specification.
To summarize, the results show that when there is a higher share of brokers at
the downstream market, after controlling for risk (fair value) and other con-
trols, upstream issuers set coupons low and issuer markups high, while there
is almost no change in broker fees. In terms of magnitude, when the share of
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brokers increases by 1 percentage point, the coupon decreases by 0.11 percent-
age points. Low coupons mean high prices, so upstream issuers raise prices
when they have a better distribution channel in the downstream market. If
there were no vertical relationship, it is hard to imagine that upstream issuers
would change their price-setting patterns when the share of brokers increases
in downstream markets.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I document some evidence of agency problems and
vertical incentives in the reverse convertible bonds market. To begin with,
I show that lower coupons are associated with higher broker fees which sug-
gests there is a conflict of interest. In terms of agency problems, I show two
pieces of evidence. One is that in this market, strictly dominated products
not only get sold but they get sold more than strictly dominating products.
The other piece of evidence is that high broker fee products get sold more
than low broker fee products after controlling for all other product character-
istics which affect investor utility. Regarding vertical incentives, I show that
vertical relationships not only affect bond sales but also upstream firms’ price-
setting patterns. While these findings suggest that there are agency problems
and vertical incentives in the market, they are not very informative about the
magnitudes. In order to figure out how severe agency problems and vertical
incentives are, I present and estimate a structural model in the third chapter.
The estimation results not only suggest there are agency problems and vertical
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incentives but they also suggest the magnitudes are severe.
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Coupon FE1 FE2
Broker Fee -0.1386* -0.1358*
(0.0763) (0.0725)
Risk (Fair Value) 0.2871*** 0.2723***
(0.0078) (0.0082)
Continuous Observations 0.0024 0.0028
(0.0020) (0.0019)
Market Fixed Effects X X
Issuer Fixed Effects X X
Equity Fixed Effects X
Observations 2684 2684
R-squared 0.1343 0.1799




Issuer JP Morgan JP Morgan
Trade Date 08/26/2008 08/26/2008
Maturity Date 08/28/2009 08/28/2009
Face Value 100 100
Coupon 12.25% 10.00%
Underlying Asset Apple Inc. Apple Inc.
Initial Share Price $173 $173
Trigger Share Price $104 $104
Coupon 12.25% 10.00%
Broker Fee 1.65% 2.89%
Issuer Markup 0.22% 1.23%
Risk (Fair Value) 14.12% 14.12%
Size 55k 1,186k
Table 2.2: Superior and Dominated Bond Pairs 1
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Bond 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Issue ISIN 4630 4713 5058 5132 5470 4895 4978
Issuer UBS UBS UBS UBS UBS UBS UBS
Trade Date 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012 03/27/2012
Maturity Date 04/04/2013 04/04/2013 04/04/2013 04/04/2013 04/04/2013 04/04/2013 04/04/2013
Face Value 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Coupon 8.32% 8.32% 8.08% 8.08% 8.07% 8.06% 8.06%
Underlying Asset HP HP HP HP HP HP HP
Initial Share Price $23.62 $23.62 $23.62 $23.62 $23.62 $23.62 $23.62
Trigger Share Price $20.08 $20.08 $20.08 $20.08 $20.08 $20.08 $20.08
Size 200k 100k 200k 100k 200k 100k 100k
Table 2.3: Superior and Dominated Bonds Pairs 2
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Bond Superior Bond Dominated Bond
Coupon 10.76% 9.65%
Broker Fee 1.46% 2.16%
Issuer Markup 6.69% 7.08%
Risk (Fair Value) 18.89% 18.89%
Size 578k 733k
Table 2.4: Superior and Dominated Bond Pairs 3
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log(Size) (USD 1k) FE1 FE2




Risk (Fair Value) -0.7071** -0.6761*
(0.3320) (0.3680)
Continuous Observations -1.3932*** -1.4018***
(0.1129) (0.1179)
Issuer Fixed Effects X X
Equity Fixed Effects X
Observations 2684 2684
R-squared 0.4326 0.4357
Note: Bond size is measured in USD 1,000. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.5: Broker Fee and Bond Size
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log(Size) (USD 1k) FE1 FE2
Broker Fee 19.9427*** 19.7750***
(4.1354) (4.1869)




Risk (Fair Value) -0.6954** -0.6634*
(0.3350) (0.3725)
Continuous Observations -1.4923*** -1.5047***
(0.1297) (0.1345)
Issuer Fixed Effects X X
Equity Fixed Effects X
Observations 2542 2542
R-squared 0.4369 0.4410
Note: Bond size is measured in USD 1,000. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.6: Share of Brokers and Bond Size
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Coupon Broker Fee Issuer Markup
FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2
Share of Brokers -0.1277*** -0.1080*** -0.0030 -0.0024 0.1308*** 0.1105***
(0.0205) (0.0192) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0208) (0.0195)
Risk (Fair Value) 0.1448*** 0.1171*** -0.0000 -0.0019 0.8551*** 0.8848
(0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0108) (0.0104)
Continuous Observations 0.0040** 0.0063*** 0.0090*** 0.0092*** -0.0131*** -0.0156***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Issuer Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Equity Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 2542 2542 2542 2542 2542 2542
R-squared 0.1651 0.2381 0.3368 0.3439 0.8503 0.8629
Note: Bond size is measured in USD 1,000. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.7: Share of Brokers and Coupon/Broker Fee/Issuer Markup
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Chapter 3
Financial Intermediaries and Agency Problems
With and Without Vertical Incentives
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Research Question
In the previous chapter, I show some descriptive evidence of agency
problems and vertical incentives in the U.S. reverse convertible bond market.
Although the evidence suggests there are agency problems and vertical incen-
tives, it is difficult to estimate the degree of agency problems and the degree
of vertical incentives using a reduced-form analysis only. For instance, the
results in Table 2.5 show that when a broker fee increases by 1 percentage
point, there is a 15% increase in a bond sales on average. We may claim
that agency problems are more severe if there were a 20% increase in a bond
sales instead of a 15% increase but it is hard to interpret the number 15%
itself. Similarly, the results in Table 2.6 show that when the share of brokers
increases by 1 percentage point, there is a 7% increase in bond sales. A 7%
increase in a bond sales suggests that there are vertical relationships between
upstream and downstream firms but it is hard to understand the degree of
vertical incentives. Does 7% mean that there are full vertical incentives or
little vertical incentives? Furthermore, while it is necessary to empirically as-
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sess the welfare effects of agency problems and vertical incentives separately
in order to fully understand their economic impacts, it is hard to disentangle
the effects of these two forces using a reduced-form analysis. Thus this makes
it difficult to run counterfactuals in which we investigate the welfare effects
of agency problems when holding the degree of vertical incentives fixed and
the welfare effects of vertical incentives when holding the degree of agency
problems fixed. With this motivation, I now introduce a structural model in
order to make the numbers in the second chapter more meaningful and more
interpretable. In this chapter, I present a structural model of the U.S. reverse
convertible bond market that allows us not only to test but also to quantify
the degree of agency problems and the degree of vertical incentives separately.
It will also enable me to evaluate the welfare effects of agency problems and
vertical incentives on consumer surplus.
In order to do this, I develop and estimate a model that measures the
degree of conflict of interest. I derive the market equilibrium where brokers
offer a bond and investors make a discrete choice to buy or not to buy a bond.
Using variation in broker fees, we get an estimate of the extent of the issue in
this market, and the results suggest that there is a severe conflict of interest
in this market. While brokers do consider the profits of their investors when
offering bonds, I estimate that their own profits are roughly three times more
important to them than the profits of their investors, suggesting the existence
of severe agency problems that reduce consumer welfare considerably. I also
include vertical incentives into a structural model and estimate the degree of
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vertical incentives using variation in the number of brokers at each downstream
broker firm. My structural estimates show that brokers are willing to give up
1 dollar of their profit if their vertically integrated issuer’s profit increases by
1.24 dollars.
Counterfactual analysis illustrates the welfare effects of agency prob-
lems and vertical incentives. Holding the degree of vertical incentives fixed,
the welfare effects of agency problems are estimated to be -11.68%. When
even more severe agency problems are considered, the welfare loss could be an
additional 31.85%. At the current level of agency problems, the welfare effects
of vertical incentives is estimated to be -2.31%. When brokers and their up-
stream firms are fully integrated, the welfare effects of vertical incentives could
cause an additional consumer loss of 0.34%. In sum, counterfactual analysis
shows that both agency problems and vertical incentives reduce consumer sur-
plus but the welfare effects of agency problems are larger than those of vertical
incentives.
3.1.2 Contributions to the Literature
This chapter contributes mainly to two strands of literature. To be-
gin with, it complements existing approaches to analyzing agency problems
in financial markets by estimating the degree of agency problems and vertical
incentives. Using a search model, Egan (2019) studies how brokers distort
retail customer investment decisions in the reverse convertible bond market.
This is the most closely related paper since it also analyzes the reverse con-
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vertible bond market. However, this paper differs from Egan (2019) in two
ways. First, I ask whether brokers care more about their investors or them-
selves. After providing some evidence that agency problems exist, Egan (2019)
models a broker as an economic agent whose only goal is to maximize bro-
ker commission. In other words, Egan (2019) assumes that there are agency
problems instead of measuring them. In this paper, however, I introduce a
flexible broker objective function and measure the extent to which broker ac-
tivity exhibits agency problems. The second contribution relative to Egan
(2019) is that I try to answer the question of whether brokers place greater
emphasis on selling their parent firm-issued products. Due to data limitations,
Egan (2019) assumes that there is no difference in broker activities when they
sell their parent firm-issued products versus when they sell their competitor
firm-issued products. In contrast, by combining two different data sets, this
chapter overcomes the data limitations and shows that brokers behave differ-
ently when they sell their vertically integrated upstream firm-issued products
compared to when they sell products issued by vertically non-integrated up-
stream competitor firms. In doing so, I add a vertical integration structure
to agency problems. In my counterfactual, I also investigate whether agency
problems are exacerbated or mitigated by vertical relationships. In addition
to Egan (2019), Robles-Garcia (2019) analyzes the effects of regulations re-
stricting broker compensation when agency problems are present in the U.K.
mortgage market. It also tries to estimate the magnitude of agency prob-
lems. Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2014) study the role of mortgage brokers
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in mortgage delinquency in the U.S. mortgage market. Finally, Anagol, Cole,
and Sarkar (2017) show that agents overwhelmingly recommend unsuitable,
strictly dominated products that provide high commissions to the agent in the
Indian life insurance market.
This chapter also contributes to the literature by presenting a new
model of agency problems. Agency problems are analyzed not only in finan-
cial markets but also in other markets. Among them, Iizuka (2007) is related
to this chapter in the sense that it also measures the severity of agency prob-
lems. However, the model in this chapter differs from his model, as this chapter
models a financial market while Iizuka (2007) models a prescription drug mar-
ket. For example, Iizuka (2007) describes a doctor and patient pair as one
economic agent since most patients passively follow the doctor’s recommenda-
tion of drugs in practice. In contrast, in the model considered in this chapter,
the broker and investor are modeled as two separate economic agents because
an investor does not necessarily always follow the broker’s recommendation
of bonds. In other words, in Iizuka’s (2007) model, a patient always takes a
drug that a doctor recommends, but in the model presented in this paper, an
investor has an option not to buy a bond that is offered by a broker. A broker,
knowing that an investor has an outside option, tries to offer a bond which an
investor would purchase. This restricts the set of bonds a broker will offer. In
addition to Iizuka (2007), Iizuka (2012) and Ho and Pakes (2014) show that
doctors are sensitive to their own financial incentives when dispensing drugs in
the prescription drug market. In the real estate market, Levitt and Syverson
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(2008) show that real estate agents behave differently when they are selling
their own houses compared to when they are selling their clients’ houses.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data. In Section 3, I develop an empirical model for the reverse convertible
bond market. In Section 4, I discuss the identification of key parameters
and introduce instruments. In Section 5, I discuss estimation and Section 6
performs counterfactual and welfare analyses. Section 7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Data
Two data sets used in this chapter are described in the first chapter.
3.3 Model
In this section, I first present a structural model of the reverse convert-
ible bonds market. Then, I discuss the model extension.
3.3.1 Model
Imagine a broker working for a broker firm b with an investor i. Investor
i is captive to the broker. The key feature of the demand model is that investor
i does not observe all the available products. A broker (he) provides a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to show only one bond to an investor i (she), and she decides
to buy it or not. If she purchases the bond, she receives a utility of uij
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uij = α · cj + β · vj + ξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
+εij, εij ∼ i.i.d.Fε (T1EV) (3.1)
where cj is a coupon of bond j, α is a coupon coefficient, vj is a risk (fair
value) of bond j, β is a risk (fair value) coefficient, and ξj is an unobserved
product characteristic. The random variable εij is investor i’s taste shock
specific to product j, which is independently and identically distributed across
investors and bonds and follows a type I extreme value distribution. δj is the
common utility for product j shared by all investors. If she does not purchase,
she receives a reservation utility ui0 = εi0. So, investor i buys bond j if and
only if uij ≥ εi0.
Next, I introduce a flexible broker objective function, which is a func-
tion of the issuer markup, broker fees, and investor utility. Formally, a broker
at broker firm b maximizes his profit πijb by selling bond j to investor i
πijb =
{
λ · τjb + (1− λ) · uij if investor i buys (uij ≥ εi0)
0 if investor i does not buy (uij < εi0)
τjb = κj + µb · Ifb · ηj (3.2)
where τjb is a seller incentive of a broker at broker firm b for bond j,
λ ∈ [0, 1] is the extent to which a broker values his seller incentives versus
the utility of the investor, κj is a broker fee for bond j, and ηj is an issuer
markup for bond j. The weight µb ∈ [0, 1] is the extent to which a broker firm
internalizes its integrated issuer profits and Ifb is a dummy variable indicating
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whether or not issuer f and broker firm b are vertically integrated. A broker
considers the issuer’s markup if they are vertically integrated (Ifb = 1) but
discounts it with µb, i.e., µb is allowed to be strictly less than 1 (Crawford,
Lee, Yurukoglu and Whinston; 2018).
To illustrate, a simple example of seller incentive is presented in Fig-
ure 3.1 and Table 3.1. Imagine a UBS issuer issues a UBS bond and a JP
Morgan issuer issues a JP Morgan bond, and they both sell it through a UBS
broker firm at the downstream market. Both the UBS bond and the JP Mor-
gan bond have 5% issuer markups and 2% broker fees. Now we calculate seller
incentives of the UBS broker firm for the UBS bond and for the JP Morgan
bond. Assuming µb = 0.5, the UBS broker firm’s seller incentive for the UBS
bond is 4.5% = 2% + 0.5 · 1 · 5%, as the UBS issuer and UBS broker firm are
vertically integrated. For the JP Morgan bond, it is 2% = 2% + 0.5 · 0 · 5%,
as the JP Morgan issuer and UBS broker firm are not vertically integrated.
Thus, I allow the UBS broker firm to favor the bond issued by the UBS issuer
over the bond issued by the JP Morgan issuer, depending on the value of µb.
The information sets of brokers and investors in this model are summa-
rized in Table 3.2. Product characteristics such as the bond’s coupon (cj), risk
(vj), broker fee (κj), issuer markup (ηj) are observed by investors, brokers and
the econometrician. Unobserved product characteristics (ξj) and investors’ id-
iosyncratic demand shocks for each bond (εij) are observed by investors and
brokers while they are unobserved by an econometrician. This means that I
assume that a broker observes εij, which means that a broker knows his in-
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vestor’s type. This is rationalized by two facts. One is that there are repeated
long-term interactions between brokers and investors and the other is that
brokers observes investors’ past investment histories. Assume a broker does
not offer bond j if an investor would not buy it. So a broker offers bond j only
if uij ≥ εi0. Then we can define a feasible set as follows.
Fij = { j |uij ≥ εi0 } (3.3)
A feasible set Fij consists of bond j that investor i would buy if offered




0 if ∃k ∈ Fij and λτjb + (1− λ)uij < λτkb + (1− λ)uik
1 if λτjb + (1− λ)uij ≥ λτkb + (1− λ)uik, ∀k ∈ Fij




φijb · 1 dF J+1ε (3.4)
where εi = (εi0, εi1, εi2, ..., εiJ), F
J+1
ε : a distribution of εi.
In Table 3.3, the interpretation of λ and µb is summarized. When λ = 0,
a broker maximizes the investor’s utility only, so there is no agency problem.
When λ = 1, a broker maximizes his own seller incentive only, so there is a
complete agency problem. When 0 < λ < 1, a broker not only maximizes
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investor utility but also maximizes his own seller incentive. Likewise, µb = 0
represents a lack of vertical incentives, which means a downstream broker does
not care about its vertically integrated upstream issuer. When µb = 1, this
means full vertical incentives. When 0 < µb < 1, a downstream broker cares
about its upstream issuer but not fully. This may indicate intra-firm frictions
or divisionalization.
Comparing the model in this paper with the literature, Egan (2019)
also analyzes the reverse convertible bond market. However, this paper differs
from his paper in terms of a broker objective function. While Egan (2019)
assumes that a broker maximizes broker fees only, I introduce a flexible broker
objective function and allow a broker to maximize issuer markup, broker fee,
and investor utility. If I were to explain his model using the model set up
considered in this paper, Egan (2019) assumes that λ = 1 and µb = 0 while
λ and µb are parameters to be estimated in this paper. Thus the model
in this paper is more general than his model in terms of a broker objective
function. 1 When I introduce a flexible broker objective function, I assume
that a broker observes εij, which means that a broker knows his investor’s type.
This is rationalized by two specific features in this market. One is that there
are usually long-term and repeated interactions between brokers and investors,
and the other is that brokers observe their investors’ past investment histories.
If an investor has purchased many dominated bonds in the past, it is likely
1On the other hand, Egan (2019) introduces a consumer search which is not considered
in the model of this paper.
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that she would purchase another dominated bond again.
In order to characterize the equilibrium, I show a simple example of
two bonds. Assume 0 ≤ λ < 1. 2 Without loss of generality, τ1b ≤ τ2b, so
Bond 2 provides a higher or equal seller incentive than Bond 1 does. Then, a
broker equilibrium strategy is summarized in Table 3.4. The first row shows a
case where selling Bond 1 is less profitable than selling Bond 2 from a broker’s
perspective. The second row is a case in which selling Bond 1 is more or equally
profitable than selling Bond 2 from a broker’s perspective. Each column shows
an investor’s preferences. The first column shows a case when an investor
prefers Bond 1 over an outside option and also prefers Bond 2 over an outside
option. The second column is a case where an investor prefers an outside
option over Bond 1 and also prefers Bond 2 over an outside option. In the
third column, an investor prefers Bond 1 followed by an outside option and
least prefers Bond 2. In the last column, an investor prefers an outside option
most. Now we investigate what happens in equilibrium in each case. In the
last column, an investor does not purchase Bond 1 or Bond 2 when offered.
Knowing this, a broker does not offer a bond. The third column shows a
case where ui1 ≥ ui0 & ui2 < ui0. If a broker offers Bond 1, an investor will
buy it while an investor would not buy Bond 2 when offered. Hence, the
broker has no choice but to offer Bond 1. Similarly, in the second column, an
investor would purchase Bond 2 when offered but would not purchase Bond
2For simplicity, I exclude λ = 1 but all results are valid when λ = 1. For instance,
sjb when λ = 1 can be computed by limλ→1 sjb. As adjustment terms involve exponential
functions only, λ = 1 is not a degenerate case.
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1 when offered. Knowing this, a broker would offer Bond 2 and an investor
would accept it. A more interesting case is shown in the first column, where
ui1 ≥ ui0 & ui2 ≥ ui0. In this case, a broker offers Bond 1 if it gives higher
profit to him and offers Bond 2 otherwise. This is where λ plays its role.
The key feature is that the broker offers Bond 1 or 2, which maximizes his
own profit rather than maximizing the investor’s profit (i.e., this is where the
distortion comes in). Assuming that εij follows an i.i.d. type I extreme value
distribution, the market share equations have the following analytical forms, 3
s1b =
eδ1








eδ2 + eδ1 + 1
, (3.7)
where adjustment terms a12b and a22b are presented in Table 3.5. The
first row shows an adjustment term for Bond 1 when a broker at broker firm
b sells Bond 1 and Bond 2. The second row shows an adjustment term for
Bond 2 when a broker at broker firm b sells Bond 1 and Bond 2. Note that
τ1b ≤ τ2b. For the market share of Bond 1, the logit market share is multiplied
by an adjustment term. When λ = 0, the adjustment term becomes 1, and
the model becomes nothing but a standard logit model (Berry 1994). When
τ1b < τ2b, meaning Bond 2 has a strictly higher seller incentive than Bond 1,
3See the appendix for market shares derivation.
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then the adjustment term a12b(λ) is a strictly decreasing function of λ while the
adjustment term a22b(λ) is a strictly increasing function of λ. Thus, adjustment
terms measure the degree of distortion induced by agency problems. It is















where an adjustment term ajnb is presented in Table 3.6. ajnb denotes
an adjustment term for jth bond when a broker at broker firm b offers n
different bonds. Note that each bond is ordered in the increasing order of
a broker’s seller incentives, τ1b ≤ τ2b ≤ ... ≤ τjb... ≤ τn−1,b ≤ τnb. Thus
brokers at different broker firms may have different orders of bonds depending
on their vertical relationships even though all brokers are offering the same
set of bonds. Now we have computed market shares within a broker firm, but
the data is such that we do not observe market shares within a broker firm.
We now aggregate them across broker firms. Based on the second data set on
a shares of brokers by firm, we aggregate market shares within a broker firm









ρb · s0b, (3.11)
where ρb denotes
the number of brokers employed by broker firm b
total number of brokers in the market
. The idea is
that if the UBS broker firm has more brokers, then there is more weight on their
market shares compared to other broker firms. An implicit assumption used
here is that investment funds managed by each broker firm are proportional to
a number of brokers employed by each broker firm. One might expect that a
more experienced broker will deal with more investment funds compared to an
inexperienced broker. But this argument is strongest for comparisons within a
broker firm, not across broker firms. Unless one broker firm has proportionally
more experienced brokers than another broker firm has, this assumption is not
harmful.
3.3.2 Model Extension: Nested Logit
I assume the simple logit utility function in the basic model, where
εij’s are independently and identically drawn from a type I extreme value
distribution. This can be a strong distributional assumption, as in reality an
investor i with a high εij for bond j may be more likely to have a high εij′ for
bond j′. To accommodate this, I extend the utility function to the nested logit
case. 4 Investor tastes still follow a type I extreme value distribution, but the
nested logit model allows investor tastes to be correlated across bonds. This
allows for more reasonable substitution patterns compared to the simple logit
4Note that all identification results discussed in later section are valid when we extend
the model to the nested logit case.
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model. First, I group the bonds into two exhaustive and mutually exclusive
sets, g = 0, 1. g = 0 indicates an outside good while g = 1 denotes inside
goods in the market. The outside option, j = 0, is assumed to be the only
member of group g = 0, and for each bond j in group g = 1, the utility of
investor i is
uij = α · cj + β · vj + ξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
+ζig + (1− σ)εij, εij ∼ i.i.d.Fε (T1EV), (3.12)
where σ is a nesting parameter. For investor i, the variable ζig is com-
mon to all bonds in g = 1 and has a distribution function that depends on a
nesting parameter σ, with 0 ≤ σ < 1. As the nesting parameter σ approaches
one, the within-group correlation goes to one, and as σ approaches zero, the
within-group correlation goes to zero as in the simple logit model.
3.4 Identification and Instruments
I discuss the identification of key parameters, λ and µb, in this section.
Then I introduce instruments to address the endogeneity issue.
3.4.1 Identification of λ
Now I discuss the source of identification for key parameters of the
model, starting with λ. Consider a simple two bond example, where µb = 0
in Figure 3.2. An issuer issues two bonds, Bond 1 and Bond 2, and sells them
through a broker firm. Bond 1 and 2 have the same common utility of 0, but
81
a broker fee for Bond 1 is 2% and a broker fee for Bond 2 is 3%, as shown in
Table 3.7. By assuming µb = 0, the seller incentive for Bond 1 will be 2% and
that for Bond 2 will be 3%, so a broker firm has more incentive to sell Bond
2 compared to Bond 1. In this setting, the model-predicted market shares
are presented in Table 3.8. When λ = 0, a broker maximizes investor utility
only, and two bonds and an outside option have the same common utility of
0; hence, all market shares are the same (0.33). When λ = 1, a broker only
cares about seller incentives (which are equal to broker fees since µb = 0).
This means a broker will try to sell Bond 2 as much as he can since it pays
a higher broker fee than Bond 1 does. However, a broker cannot always force
an investor to buy Bond 2 because of her reservation utility. So, as long as an
investor’s utility from Bond 2 is greater than or equal to a reservation utility,
a broker will offer and sell Bond 2. Since Bond 2 and an outside option are
equally attractive to investors, the probability that an investor’s utility from
Bond 2 will be greater than that of the outside option is 0.50. Concerning
Bond 1, it is still profitable for a broker to sell it to earn the 2% broker fee if
he cannot sell Bond 2 since a broker earns nothing when an investor chooses
an outside option. This is the case where an investor values Bond 1 most, the
outside option next and Bond 2 the least. As there are three products that
are equally attractive to investors, the probability of this particular order is
1/6 or 0.17. For Bond 1, which has a lower broker fee, the market share when
λ = 0.5 is lower than the market share when λ = 0 but higher than the market
share when λ = 1. In contrast, for Bond 2, which has a higher broker fee, the
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market share when λ = 0.5 is higher than the market share when λ = 0 but
lower than the market share when λ = 1. What we learn from this exercise
is that for Bond 1 with a lower broker fee, its market shares decrease when
λ increases. For Bond 2 with a higher broker fee, its market shares increase
when λ increases. This example shows that variation in broker fees identifies
λ. In other words, the extent to which broker fees affect market shares will
identify λ. As broker fees are endogenously chosen by upstream issuers, I use
instruments to address the issue of endogeneity.
3.4.2 Identification of µb
Next, I discuss the source of identification for µb. To illustrate, consider
a simple example of two broker firms where λ = µb = 0.5. As in Figure 3.3,
imagine that the UBS issuer issues a UBS bond and sells it through the UBS
broker firm and the JP Morgan broker firm. Likewise, the JP Morgan issuer
issues a JP Morgan bond and also sells it through the UBS broker firm and
the JP Morgan broker firm. As shown in Table 3.9, the UBS and JP Morgan
bonds have the same product characteristics. Both bonds have 0 common
utility, 2.0% broker fee and 5.0% issuer markup. However, the UBS broker
firm and the JP Morgan broker firm have different seller incentives due to
their vertical relationships. The UBS broker firm has a seller incentive of 4.5%
5 for the UBS bond and 2.0% 6 for the JP Morgan bond, arising from their
54.5% = 2.0% + 0.5 * 1 * 5.0%
62.0% = 2.0% + 0.5 * 0 * 5.0%
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vertical relationship. It is symmetric in the JP Morgan broker firm’s case.
What is not symmetric is the number of brokers employed by each broker
firm. As illustrated in Table 3.10, the UBS broker firm has 60 brokers while
the JP Morgan broker firm has 40 brokers in Market 1. In Market 2, the UBS
broker firm has even more brokers, 80, and the JP Morgan broker firm has
only 20.
With the assumption that each broker manages USD 1mm as a nor-
malization, the market shares are presented in Table 3.11. The market size
is USD 100mm, as there are 100 brokers in each market. In Market 1, the
market size USD 100mm is split into USD 60mm and USD 40mm according
to the number of brokers in each broker firm. Within a broker firm, market
shares are computed according to Equation (3.8). For a UBS broker firm, the
market share of a UBS bond is 0.48 so a bond size is 28.8mm and the market
share of a JP Morgan bond is 0.19 so a bond size is 11.4mm. For a JP Morgan
broker firm, the market share of a UBS bond is 0.19 so a bond size is 7.6mm
and the market share of a JP Morgan bond is 0.48 so a bond size is 19.2mm.
At the market level, the total size of a UBS bond is 36.4mm 7 and the total
size of a JP Morgan bond is 30.6mm. 8 As can be expected, within a broker
firm, market shares are symmetric in the UBS broker firm and the JP Morgan
broker firm, but overall, the UBS bond has more market share (36.4%) than




broker firm, which has more brokers than the JP Morgan broker firm has.
In Market 2, the market size USD 100mm is split into USD 80mm and USD
20mm according to the number of brokers in each broker firm. There are no
changes in seller incentives between Market 1 and Market 2 but the number
of brokers changes. For a UBS broker firm, the market share of a UBS bond
is still 0.48 as its seller incentives do not change. Given that it has the market
size of 80mm, the bond size now becomes 38.4mm. The market share of a JP
Morgan bond is 0.19 so the bond size is 15.2mm. For a JP Morgan broker firm,
the market share of a UBS bond is still 0.19 but now the bond size becomes
only 3.8mm as it loses its brokers. The market share of a JP Morgan bond
is 0.48 and the bond size is 9.6mm. At the market level, the total size of a
UBS bond is 42.2mm 9 and the total size of a JP Morgan bond is 24.8mm. 10
Compared to Market 1, in Market 2, the UBS bond gains even more market
share (42.2%) as the number of brokers in the UBS broker firm increases. This
simple example illustrates the identification of µb. The extent to which the
number of vertically integrated brokers affects market shares will identify µb.
If µb =0, the market share of the UBS bond will be the same in Markets 1
and 2. If µb is high, then the market share of the UBS bond in Market 2 will
increase more compared to the market share of the UBS bond in Market 1.
Thus, exogenous time variation in the share of brokers at each broker firm ρb




used in identifying µb. However, as I add issuer fixed effects in the structural
estimation, I rely on time variation rather than cross-sectional variation of the
share of brokers.
3.4.3 Instruments
If issuers choose coupons and broker fees considering product char-
acteristics of bonds unobserved by the econometrician, then these two price
variables are endogenous as they are potentially correlated with unobserved
characteristics. To resolve this endogeneity issue, I use differentiation IVs
as suggested by Gandhi and Houde (2017). Three instruments measure the
degree of differentiation in the product space.
The first instrument, which I denote by Z1, measures the Euclidean
distance between the product and the issuer’s competitors’ products in terms




(vj′ − vj)2 (3.13)
The second instrument, denoted by Z2, measures the Euclidean dis-
tance between the product and other products issued by the same issuer in




(vj′ − vj)2 (3.14)
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The last instrument, denoted by Z3, measures the number of products
with the same underlying asset in the market. For instance, if a bond is linked
to the Apple stock price, the third instrument shows how many Apple-linked
bonds are offered in the market. The basic idea is that the first two instruments
measure the degree of differentiation in terms of risks (fair values) while the
last instrument measures the degree of differentiation in terms of underlying
assets. The latter will affect how issuers set prices whether or not investors
have a close substitute.
To illustrate, a simple example is presented in Table 3.12. Issuer 1
issues Bond 1 and Bond 2 while Issuer 2 issues Bond 3 and Bond 4. Bond 1
has a risk of 15 and is linked to an Apple stock price. Bond 2 has a risk of 17
and is also linked to an Apple stock price. Bond 3 has a risk of 14 and is also
linked to an Apple stock price. Bond 4 has a risk of 16 and is linked to an
IBM stock price. Now we calculate instruments for Bond 1. For Bond 1, the
first instrument measures the distance between Bond 1 and Bond 3/Bond 4 so
zj=1,1 =
√
2. 11 The second instrument measures the distance between Bond
1 and Bond 2 so zj=1,2 = 2.
12 The last instrument measures the number of











In this section, I first explain the estimation strategy to recover struc-
tural parameters. Then I discuss the estimation results. I also make a policy
recommendation.
3.5.1 Estimation Strategy
The estimation strategy involves three steps. In Step 1, given any
µb ∈ [0, 1], λ ∈ [0, 1), and σ ∈ [0, 1), we find δj using a contraction mapping.
13 14
Step 2 is an instrumental variables regression to back out ξ̂(µb, λ, σ)
using the following assumption.
E[ ξ(µb, λ, σ) | z1, v ] = 0. (3.15)
In Step 3, I construct a GMM objective function for the demand side.
15 I consider the following moment condition.
Moment: E[ ξ(µb, λ, σ) | (
∑
b
Ifb · ρb) · η, z2, z3 ] = 0. (3.16)
13Note that compared to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we apply the modified
contraction mapping as we allow for a nesting parameter σ in the investor utility function,
i.e. fj(δ) = δj + (1 − σ){log(sj) − log(sj(δ))}. For detailed explanation, see Grigolon and
Verboven (2014).
14Alternatively, we can use Berry inversion if sjb data is available.
15In particular, I use a continuous-updating GMM.
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Based on this conditional moment condition, I construct a set of un-
conditional moment conditions and estimate µb, λ, and σ by GMM.
3.5.2 Estimation Results
The main estimation results are presented in Table 3.13 for a simple
logit model and Table 3.14 for a nested logit model. In each table, the first
column shows the estimation results when we assume that coupons and broker
fees are exogenous. The second column shows the estimation results when we
instrument for coupons and broker fees. All specifications include both issuer
fixed effects and equity fixed effects. In the simple logit case, the λ estimate in
the first row is 0.5753 under an exogenous price assumption while it is 0.4666
under an endogenous price assumption. The λ estimate being bigger than 0
while being smaller than 1 indicates that brokers not only care about their own
financial incentives but they also care about their investors. The µb estimate
in the second row is 0.2775 under an exogenous price assumption while it is
0.1821 under an endogenous price assumption. The µb estimate being bigger
than 0 means brokers care about their vertically integrated issuer’s profits
while being smaller than 1 means brokers and issuers are not fully integrated.
The α estimate in the third row is 0.0142 under an exogenous price assumption
while it is 0.0860 under an endogenous price assumption. As we can expect,
investors prefer higher coupons holding others fixed. The β estimate in the
fourth row is -0.0046 under an exogenous price assumption while it is -0.0129
under an endogenous price assumption. As one can expect, investors prefer
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less risk holding others fixed.
In the nested logit case, the estimate of λ in the first row is 0.3157
under an exogenous price assumption while it is 0.4984 under an endogenous
price assumption. Again, the estimated λ is bigger than 0 and smaller than 1
which indicates that brokers care about both their own incentives and investor
utilities. The µb estimate in the second row is 0.6475 under an exogenous price
assumption while it is 0.8017 under an endogenous price assumption. Similarly
with the results from the previous table, the µb estimate is bigger than 0 and
smaller 1 which suggests partial vertical incentives. The α estimate in the third
row is 0.0140 under an exogenous price assumption while it is 0.3300 under an
endogenous price assumption. The positive signs of the estimates show that
investors prefer higher coupons holding everything else fixed. The β estimate
in the fourth row is -0.0269 under an exogenous price assumption while it
is -0.0926 under an endogenous price assumption. The negative signs of the
estimates show that investors prefer less risk holding others fixed. The nesting
parameter σ estimate in the fifth row is 0.5927 under an exogenous price
assumption and it is 0.7844 under an endogenous price assumption. A higher
value of nesting parameter estimate means investor’s idiosyncratic demand
shocks for reverse convertible bonds are positively correlated. This is expected
because if an investor has a positive demand shock for one reverse convertible
bond, then it is more likely that she has a positive demand shock for another
reverse convertible bond as well. Among four specifications, the last column
in Table 3.14 is the most preferred specification, where we instrument for
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potential endogeneity, add both fixed effects and allow correlation between
idiosyncratic errors. Recall that under the fiduciary duty requirement, λ needs
to be close to 0, as brokers are expected to maximize investor utility. However,
λ is estimated to be 0.4984. Also, in an arms-length transaction, µb needs to
be close to 0, but it is estimated to be 0.8017.
πijb = λ · (κj + µb · Ifb · ηj) + (1− λ) · uij




In order to interpret the results, we need to be particularly careful about
the units. Broker fees and issuer markups in the first term on the right-hand
side in the equation above are measured in U.S. dollars, but investor utility in
the second term is not. So, we divide and multiply by the coupon coefficient
α in order to express it in terms of U.S. dollars. Broker profit goes up by λ
when a broker receives $1, while broker profit goes up by (1 − λ)α when an
investor receives $1. Thus, brokers are willing to give up 1 dollar of their own
profit if their investor’s profit goes up by 3.01 dollars. 16 In order to put this
number into perspective, I compare the results with Iizuka (2007). He shows
that physicians are willing to give up 1 dollar of their profit from markup if
they can reduce the cost to the patient by 28 cents in the Japanese prescription
drugs market. If I compare these two numbers only, it seems agency problems
are more severe in the U.S. financial market than in the Japanese prescription
163.01 = 0.4984(1−0.4984)·0.3300
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drug market. Similarly, regarding vertical incentives, brokers are willing to
give up 1 dollar of their profit if their vertically integrated issuer’s profit goes
up by 1.24 dollars. 17
3.5.3 Discussion
In deriving the results, I use an implicit assumption that investment
funds managed by each broker firm are proportional to the number of brokers
employed by each broker firm. The reason I introduce this assumption is
related to the current filing requirements. Under current Form 424B, each
issuer is required by the SEC to report the size of bonds issued at the overall
market level but not at a broker firm level. For instance, a UBS issuer is
required to report the size of each bond issued across all broker firms, including
UBS and JP Morgan broker firms, but not the breakdown of each broker firm,
such as how much is sold through the UBS and JP Morgan broker firms. Thus,
I introduce this assumption in order to recover the market shares within a
broker firm. By adopting a stronger filing requirement, according to which all
issuers are required to report how much bond size is sold by each broker firm,
we will be able to accumulate more detailed data. With new data, I believe we
will be able to obtain more precise estimates of the degree of agency problems
and those of the degree of vertical incentives. Further, with new data, we will
be able to answer other interesting questions, such as whether broker firms
have different degrees of agency problems instead of assuming that all broker
171.24 = 0.49840.4984·0.8017
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firms have the same degree as in this paper.
3.6 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, I first explain the assumptions needed for a counterfac-
tual analysis. Then I discuss the counterfactual results.
3.6.1 Setting
In this section, I use the estimates from the main model to simulate
counterfactual scenarios. First, I consider equilibrium effects from agency
problems holding the degree of vertical incentives fixed. Second, I consider
the welfare effects of vertical incentives between upstream issuers and down-
stream broker firms when holding the degree of agency problems fixed. In all
simulations, I make assumptions used in a short-run analysis. The product
space is fixed so that brokers do not change their available products and that
there is no entry or exit in the market. Investor preferences remain unchanged.
I define the social surplus in the following ways. First, issuer profit is
the sum of all issuer markups across all bonds.
∑
j
M · sj · ηj, (3.18)
where M is the total market size. Second, broker firm profit is the sum




M · sj · κj (3.19)
Finally, consumer surplus is the sum of all investor utilities across all























































where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. 18 For each scenario, I
assume that choices made by the upstream issuer are exogenous. Given the
fixed product space, I run counterfactuals with new parameter values of λ and
µb.
3.6.2 Counterfactual Results
The counterfactual analysis of consumer surplus is presented in Ta-
ble 3.15. Each column corresponds to a different value of λ such as λ = 0,
λ = 0.49, λ = 0.70. Similarly, each row corresponds to a different value of
µb, such as µb = 0, µb = 0.80 and µb = 1. The baseline is the case when
λ = 0.49 and µb = 0.80, which is based on the main estimation results, and
18γ ≈ 0.5772
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the consumer surplus at the baseline is $17,109,000. In each cell or each coun-
terfactual, there are two rows. The first row in each cell shows the absolute
difference between the consumer surplus at this scenario and the consumer sur-
plus at the baseline. For instance, under perfect regulation enforcement (λ = 0
and µb = 0), consumer surplus increases by $1,999,000 compared to the base-
line, resulting in a total consumer surplus of $19,108,000. 19 The second row
in each cell shows the relative difference between the consumer surplus in this
scenario and the consumer surplus at the baseline. For instance, under perfect
regulation enforcement (λ = 0 and µb = 0), consumer surplus is 11.68% larger
than at the baseline estimates. 20 In the first column, the second row in each
cell is all 11.68% since vertical incentives do not play a role when there are no
agency problems, λ = 0. In the second column, the second row in each cell is
2.31%, 0.00%, -0.34% from top to bottom of the column. This shows the con-
sumer welfare effects of vertical incentives while holding the degree of agency
problems fixed. In the third column, the second row in each cell is -30.11%,
-31.85%, -31.94% from top to bottom of the column. It indicates how vertical
incentives affect consumer welfare when agency problems are very severe. In
a similar fashion, when we compare different columns for the same row, we
are able to investigate the welfare effects of agency problems while holding the
degree of vertical incentives fixed.




11.68% compared to the case when λ = 0 and µb = 0.80, which characterizes
the size of agency costs. Although 11.68% is substantial, I believe agency costs
of 11.68% are underestimated for two reasons. The first reason is that I fix
the upstream issuer’s side. When λ = 0, brokers behave differently but issuers
do not change their price-settings in current counterfactuals, i.e. the product
space is exogenously given. However, once issuers adjust their price-setting
behaviors knowing that brokers now behave differently, the consumer surplus
loss is expected to be greater than 11.68%. Secondly, the counterfactual exer-
cise involves the substitution within inside goods only. In my counterfactual
analysis, brokers offer other reverse convertible bonds when the structural pa-
rameters change. One may view a group of reverse convertible bonds as bad
products. In this view, my counterfactual analysis can be seen as brokers offer-
ing less bad products rather than offering better products other than reverse
convertible bonds. If the counterfactual analysis were to allow the substitution
to other products, I believe agency costs would be higher than 11.68%.
When λ = 0.70, which means that there are more severe agency prob-
lems, consumer surplus decreases by an additional 31.85%. The change in
consumer surplus is 11.68% when λ moves from 0 to 0.49, but when λ moves
from 0.49 to 0.70, the change in consumer surplus is 31.85%, which seems
large. The reason for this is that λ
(1−λ)α is a better measure than λ itself, as
λ does not take units into account. When λ = 0, λ
(1−λ)α = 0, which means a
broker is not responsive to broker fees at all. When λ = 0.49, λ
(1−λ)α = 3.01,
which indicates that a broker values his own profit 3.01 times more than his
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investor’s profit. Lastly, when λ = 0.70, λ
(1−λ)α = 7.07, which indicates that
a broker values his own profit 7.07 times more than his investor’s profit. In
addition, I find that the welfare effects of vertical incentives are negative, as
consumer welfare is 2.31% lower compared to a counterfactual when λ = 0.49
and µb = 0. When λ = 0.49 and µb = 1, consumer welfare goes down by
an additional 0.34%. The reason that the welfare effects of vertical incentives
are negative is that there is no double marginalization in this market. Con-
sequently, there is no gain in consumer surplus due to vertical incentives. In
sum, both agency problems and vertical incentives reduce consumer welfare,
although the magnitude is much larger for agency problems than for vertical
incentives.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter investigates agency problems in the financial advising in-
dustry. In particular, I consider potential incentive problems between brokers
and their investors. In doing so, this chapter contributes to the literature by
estimating the severity of agency problems and the degree of vertical incentives
in the U.S. reverse convertible bond market. The results suggest that while
brokers do consider the profits of their investors, their own profits are roughly
three times more important to them than the profits of their investors. I also
show that brokers value their own profit 24% more than the profit accrued to
their vertically integrated upstream firm. It also contributes to the literature
by presenting a new agency model in which consumers have an outside option,
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which has not been allowed in previous agency models. Although the empir-
ical model in this paper best describes the reverse convertible bond market,
this framework can be used not only in other retail financial markets where
brokers recommend financial products to their investors but also non-financial
markets where experts offer products to their consumers. It will be interesting
to compare the degree of agency problems in many markets using the unified
framework suggested in this chapter.
Lastly, I move to a discussion of potential future extensions. In deriv-
ing my results, I assume that brokers know their clients (i.e., brokers observe
investor types). While this can be justified by the fact that brokers and in-
vestors usually have long-term repetitive relationships, this may not be true.
In my future work, it will be interesting to see whether or not brokers know
their clients, and individual-level data on brokers and investors will be particu-
larly useful in determining this. In addition, we could also consider a dynamic
model. I use a static model to measure the degree of agency problems, but
the λ estimate in this model may capture some of the dynamic aspects of
broker-investor relationships. I leave these as future extensions.
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UBS Bond JP Morgan Bond
Issuer Markup (ηj) 5% 5%
Broker Fee (κj) 2% 2%
Seller Incentive (τjb) 4.5% = 2% + 0.5 · 1 · 5% 2% = 2% + 0.5 · 0 · 5%
Table 3.1: Seller Incentive Example
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Investor Broker Econometrician
cj, vj, κj, ηj Observable Observable Observable
ξj, εij Observable Observable Unobservable
Table 3.2: Information Structure
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λ Interpretation µb Interpretation
λ = 0 No agency problem µb = 0 No vertical incentives
0 < λ < 1 Partial agency problem 0 < µb < 1 Partial vertical incentives
λ = 1 Complete agency problem µb = 1 Full vertical incentives
Table 3.3: Interpretation of λ and µb
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ui1 ≥ ui0 ui1 < ui0 ui1 ≥ ui0 ui1 < ui0
& ui2 ≥ ui0 & ui2 ≥ ui0 & ui2 < ui0 & ui2 < ui0
λτ1b + (1− λ)ui1 < λτ2b + (1− λ)ui2 Bond 2 Bond 2 Bond 1 No bond offer
λτ1b + (1− λ)ui1 ≥ λτ2b + (1− λ)ui2 Bond 1 Bond 2 Bond 1 No bond offer











































Table 3.6: Adjustment Terms for n ≥ 2 Bonds
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Bond 1 Bond 2
Common Utility (δj) 0 0
Broker Fee (κj) 2.0% 3.0%
Seller Incentive (τj) 2.0% 3.0%
Table 3.7: λ Identification: Bond Product Characteristics
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λ = 0 λ = 0.5 λ = 1
s1 0.33 0.24 0.17
s2 0.33 0.42 0.50
s0 0.33 0.33 0.33
Table 3.8: λ Identification: Market Shares
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UBS Bond JP Morgan Bond
Common Utility (δj) 0 0
Broker Fee (κj) 2.0% 2.0%
Issuer Markup (ηj) 5.0% 5.0%
UBS Broker Firm Seller Incentive (τjU) 4.5% 2.0%
JP Morgan Broker Firm Seller Incentive (τjJ) 2.0% 4.5%
Table 3.9: µb Identification: Bond Product Characteristics
107
UBS Broker Firm JP Morgan Broker Firm Total
Market 1 60 40 100
Market 2 80 20 100
Table 3.10: Number of Brokers
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Market 1
UBS Broker Firm JP Morgan Broker Firm Market
sjU USD (mm) sjJ USD (mm) sj USD (mm)
UBS Bond 0.48 28.8 0.19 7.6 0.364 36.4
JP Morgan Bond 0.19 11.4 0.48 19.2 0.306 30.6
Bond 0 0.33 19.8 0.33 13.2 0.330 33.0
Total 1.00 60.0 1.00 40.0 1.000 100.0
Market 2
UBS Broker Firm JP Morgan Broker Firm Market
sjU USD (mm) sjJ USD (mm) sj USD (mm)
UBS Bond 0.48 38.4 0.19 3.8 0.422 42.2
JP Morgan Bond 0.19 15.2 0.48 9.6 0.248 24.8
Bond 0 0.33 26.4 0.33 6.6 0.330 33.0
Total 1.00 80.0 1.00 20.0 1.000 100.0
Table 3.11: µb Identification: Market Shares
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Bond (j) Issuer (f) Risk (Fair Value) (v) Underlying Asset
1 1 15 Apple
2 1 17 Apple
3 2 14 Apple
4 2 16 IBM
Table 3.12: Instruments Example
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Simple Logit
Exogenous Prices Endogenous Prices
Broker Objective Function
Seller Incentive λ 0.5753** 0.4666*
(0.2533) (0.2539)
Issuer Profit µb 0.2775 0.1821
(0.2250) (0.2646)
Investor Utility Function
Coupon α 0.0142 0.0860*
(0.0097) (0.0488)
Risk (Fair Value) β -0.0046 -0.0129*
(0.0040) (0.0069)
Issuer FE X X
Equity FE X X
Table 3.13: Simple Logit Demand Estimation Results
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Nested Logit
Exogenous Prices Endogenous Prices
Broker Objective Function
Seller Incentive λ 0.3157 0.4984***
(0.2021) (0.1156)
Issuer Profit µb 0.6475 0.8017**
(0.4152) (0.3242)
Investor Utility Function
Coupon α 0.0140 0.3300
(0.0119) (0.7847)
Risk (Fair Value) β -0.0269*** -0.0926
(0.0049) (0.0920)
Nesting Parameter σ 0.5927*** 0.7844***
(0.1189) (0.0731)
Issuer FE X X
Equity FE X X
Table 3.14: Nested Logit Demand Estimation Results
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in $ No Agency Problem Partial Agency Problem More Severe Agency Problem
(in %) (λ = 0.00) (λ = 0.49) (λ = 0.70)
No Vertical Incentives $1,999,000 $396,000 -$5,152,000
(µb = 0.00) (11.68%) (2.31%) (-30.11%)
Partial Vertical Incentives $1,999,000 $0 -$5,450,000
(µb = 0.80) (11.68%) (0.00%) (-31.85%)
Full Vertical Incentives $1,999,000 -$58,000 -$5,464,000
(µb = 1.00) (11.68%) (-0.34%) (-31.94%)
Table 3.15: Consumer Surplus per Market
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Figure 3.1: UBS Broker
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Figure 3.2: Two Bonds Example
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To begin with, assume two bonds and an outside option with 0 ≤
λ < 1 and τ1b ≤ τ2b. Assume the simple logit utility function. I compute
market shares of each bond by integrating over investor population which is






































f 3ε dxdydz, (A.3)
where f 3ε = exp(−x−e−x)·exp(−y−e−y)·exp(−z−e−z), A12 = λ1−λ(τ2b−τ1b)+
δ2 − δ1. Based on a type I extreme value distribution, I derive an analytical
form for each market share.
s1b =
eδ1
eδ2 + eδ1 + 1
· e
δ2− λ1−λ (τ2b−τ1b) + eδ1−
λ
1−λ (τ2b−τ1b) + 1
eδ2 + eδ1−
λ




eδ2 + eδ1 + 1
· e
δ2− λ1−λ (τ2b−τ2b) + eδ1−
λ
1−λ (τ2b−τ2b) + 1
eδ2 + eδ1−
λ




eδ2 + eδ1 + 1
(A.6)
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Note that I label the n bonds by ascending seller incentive order, τ1b ≤ τ2b ≤
... ≤ τjb ≤ ... ≤ τnb.
Now I extend it to the nested logit model. Assume two bonds are
members of inside goods g = 1 and an outside option is the only member of
g = 0. By allowing investor tastes to be correlated across two bonds which















































































































































Note that market share equations in Equation (A.12) has a very general
form in the sense that it becomes market shares in Equation (A.7) when σ = 0
and it becomes market shares in the standard nested logit model when λ = 0.





As in the previous appendix, I start with two bonds and an outside
option. Assume 0 ≤ λ < 1, τ1b ≤ τ2b, and the simple logit utility function.
For broker firm b, I compute an expected utility by integrating over investor




































x · f 3ε dxdydz,
(B.1)
where f 3ε = exp(−x−e−x)·exp(−y−e−y)·exp(−z−e−z), A12 = λ1−λ(τ2b−τ1b)+
δ2 − δ1. Based on a type I extreme value distribution, I derive an analytical
































log(1 + eδ1 + eδ2) + γ
1 + eδ1 + eδ2
(B.2)
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where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. It is straightforward to calculate






























In order to get the consumer surplus, I aggregate this expression across
all broker firms and divide it by the coupon coefficient α to convert to U.S.




























































































Note that the consumer surplus in Equation (B.5) has a very general
form in the sense that it becomes the consumer surplus as in Equation (B.4)
when σ = 0 and it becomes the consumer surplus in the standard nested logit
model when λ = 0. Lastly, it becomes the log-sum consumer surplus in the




In this appendix, I model the way in which an upstream issuer sets
coupons and broker fees. To begin, a multi-product issuer f has a profit










κk · skb}, (C.1)
ηj = vj − cj − κj , (C.2)
where µf ∈ [0, 1]: the extent to which an issuer internalizes its inte-
grated broker firm profits, Ff : a set of every bond issued by issuer f , sj: the
market share of bond j for all the broker firms, skb: the market share of bond
k for broker firm b such that
∑
k skb = 1, sk =
∑
b ρb · skb. Similar to a broker
firm case, an issuer considers broker profits if they are vertically integrated,
but they discount them with µf .
First, in the equilibrium, an issuer sets coupons to maximize its profit.
Given risks (fair values) and broker fees, every issuer f chooses coupons to




















)} = 0. (C.3)
Second, in a similar fashion, an issuer sets broker fees. Given risks (fair
values) and coupons, every issuer f chooses broker fees to maximize its profits























It is worth to note that broker fee κ plays three different roles. First, it
is nothing but effective marginal costs for issuers as issuers need to pay broker











κk · skb}, (C.5)
Second, it is also a part of perceived profits for issuers if issuers and
brokers are vertically integrated as seen in the second term of the right-hand










κk · skb}, (C.6)
Lastly, it provides an incentive to brokers as seen in the equation below.
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πijb = λ · τjb + (1− λ) · uij (C.7)
where τjb = κj + µb · Ifb · ηj
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